Bruno(and others) I am going to do this in two posts. The first is my interpretation of your UDA. Since the Brain is a Turing emulatable program running on a biological platform(to start), steps 1-5 are not controversal. Step 6 scan(and annilates) the body and only places the program on another physical hardware platform, for a finite amount of time. Step 7 is the usual scan and annihilate, and then looks for the program in the UD still on some physical platform? Step 8 removes the physical universe and had the UD "running" in Arithmetical Platonia? If I basically understand this correctly, then I will interpret UDA from my(physicla scineces POV). Ronald
On Dec 2, 10:55 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > On 02 Dec 2010, at 15:51, ronaldheld wrote: > > > Bruno: > > I looked at UDA via the SANE paper. I am not certain the the mind is > > Turing emulatable, but will move onward. > > OK. It is better to say brain instead of mind. The doctor proposes an > artificial digital brain, and keep silent on what is the mind, just > that it will be preserved locally through the running of the adequate > computer. > > > Using Star Trek transporter > > concepts, I can accept steps 1 through 5. > > Nice. Note that the Star trek transporter usually annihilates the > original (like in quantum teleportation), but if I am a "program" (a > natural program) then it can be duplicated (cut, copy and paste apply > to it). > > > Step 6 takes only the mind > > (the program, or the digital instantaneous state of a program) > > > and sends it to a finite computational device or the entire person > > into a device similar to a Holodeck, > > It is just a computer. A physical embodiment of a (Turing) Universal > Machine. Assuming the "mind state" (here and now) can be captured as > an instantaneous description of a digital program, nobody can feel the > difference between "reality" and its physical digital emulation, at > least for a period (which is all what is needed for the probability or > credibility measure). > > > where the person is a > > Holocharacter? > > A person is what appears when the correct program (which exists by the > mechanist assumption) is executed ('runned') in a physical computer. > > > I am not certain a UD is physically possible in a > > finite resource Universe. > > You don't need this to get the indeterminacy, non-locality and even > the non clonability, unless you add that the resource are finite and > enough little (in which case you still have the indeterminacy and non- > locality in case of self-duplication in that little universe of course). > After UDA 1-7, you know that if you make a physical experiment, the > result that you will perceive depend on the absence of similar state > of "your body" in the (physical) universe. > > Then, with step 8, you can realize that even that move toward a little > physical universe will not help to throw away the 1-indterminacy, non- > locality and non clonability. The reason is that Arithmetical Platonia > becomes the universal "Holodeck", if you want. > UDA 1-7 shows that the mind (the first person) cannot distinguish a > physical reality from a physical emulation of it (for a short time), > but after step 8, we can see that the person cannot even feel the > difference between a physical emulation and an arithmetical emulation, > which exists out of space and time independently of any observers (by > Church thesis, arithmetic and computer science). That is subtler than > UDA 1-7, but it makes the argument a proof, i.e. a proof that physics > just cannot be the fundamental theory, once we assume digital > mechanism. The physical laws have a reason, and even a > "space" (arithmetical truth) where, from the point of view of the > observers, they have been selected. > > Thanks for your reply, and ask any supplementary questions if > interested. I am trying to work on the official "english" papers. > After that I will write a book. I have succeeded in explaining step 8 > to many different publics now, so that I think I have the whole thing > straight. > > AUDA, on the contrary, is well understood only by logicians, but > physicists have still problem with basic logic. There is a real big > gap between logicians and physicists. I was hoping that quantum > computations would make a bridge, but that will still take a long > time. Anyway, UDA is enough to understand the main point. > AUDA is cute, because it shows that the intelligent machine are > already here. It shows also that intelligence is mainly a right, not a > gift (but many people dislike this, and that is hardly astonishing > when you look at the history of humanity: it is the sempiternal fear > of the others). > > Bruno > > > > > > > On Nov 28, 5:52 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote: > > >>> Jason(and any others) > >>> Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. Bruno's > >>> reality is equally hard to convincing present. > >>> Ronald > > >> Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in > >> principle duplicable? This entails subjective indeterminacy. > >> All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to > >> understand UDA 1-7. > > >> UDA-8, which justifies immateriality, is slightly more subtle, but if > >> you have followed the last conversation on it on the list (with > >> Jacques Mallah, Stathis, ..) you could understand than to block the > >> movie graph argument you have to attribute a computational role to > >> the > >> physical activity of something having non physical activity, and I > >> don't see how we could still accept a digital brain in this case. > >> With > >> just UDA 1-7 you could already understand that most of quantum > >> weirdness (indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability) is a > >> qualitative almost direct consequence of digital mechanism (even in > >> presence of a primitively material universe). > > >> AUDA, the Löbian interview, is another matter because you need > >> familiarity with mathematical logic and recursion theory. > > >> Tell me please what you don't understand in the first steps of UDA. I > >> am always interested to have an idea of what is it that people don't > >> grasp. I am writing some "official" papers now, and that could help. > >> Up to now the results are more ignored than criticized, or is > >> considered as crap by religious atheist/materialist, without rational > >> arguments. Tell me if you have a problem with the subjective (first > >> person) indeterminacy. Thanks. > > >> Bruno > > >>> On Nov 26, 12:02 am, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >>>> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:50 PM, ronaldheld <[email protected]> > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> Jason: > >>>>> I see what you are saying up at our level of understanding, I do > >>>>> not > >>>>> know how to present that in a technically convincing matter. > >>>>> Ronald > > >>>> Which message in particular do you think is difficult to > >>>> present convincingly? Tegmark's ideas that everything is real, or > >>>> the > >>>> suggestion that computer simulation might be a legitimate tool for > >>>> exploration? > > >>>> Jason > > >>> -- > >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >>> Groups "Everything List" group. > >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > >>> . > >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > >>> [email protected] > >>> . > >>> For more options, visit this group > >>> athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > >>> . > > >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text - > > >> - Show quoted text - > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > [email protected] > > . > > For more options, visit this group > > athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > . > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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