On Dec 5, 11:02 pm, Rex Allen <[email protected]> wrote:
> So I would say that time exists within conscious experience, conscious > experience doesn't exist within time. All experiences that exist, do > so eternally and timelessly. So you say, but nothing is experienced *as* eternal > > The thoughts of those life > > forms is not likely to look like random snow, since that would not be useful > > for their survival. > > The contents of thoughts and the survival of the thinker are caused by > the same thing...the initial conditions and causal laws of the > universe. > > The contents of thoughts do not cause the survival of the thinker. They are a practical and high level description of the causes. The existence of the trees does not disprove the forest > Like 1Z, you're assigning causal power to abstractions that only exist > "for you". There is a difference between a high level description and a pure abstraction > > If I start with thought as primitive, and try to > > explain that thought under accidental idealism I can go no further. While > > it explains the existence of thought (by definition) it seems like an > > intellectual dead end. > > It's an answer that doesn't generate any additional questions...so > it's an "end" in that sense. But so is any explanation that stops dead somewhere. However, you object to that. You object to persuing an explanation back N places only to stop dead -- except where N=0. > So there can only be one ultimate answer: there is no reason for the > way things are. OK. So why is the N=0 version better than the N>0 version? > That's it. > > Supposed "answers" that introduce unexplained causal laws or entities > are vulnerable to the same questions they were introduced to explain. > > What explains the order of our experiences? Orderly causal laws! But > then what explains orderly causal laws? > > You just end up with infinite regress. Or an unexplained first cause. Your version of events is unexpected first cause where the cause is identical to the effect. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
