Hi Bruno, From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 1:27 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments
On 11 Oct 2010, at 00:54, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Fixing a missing part of my post
From: Stephen Paul King
Sent: Sunday, October 10, 2010 2:46 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments
Hi Bruno,
Interleaving...
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Sunday, October 10, 2010 11:16 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments
Hi Stephen,
snip
[BM] All digital parallelism can be emulated by digital sequences. In
the mind-body problem parallelism is a red herring, because IF it plays some
role for the measure problem, THEN it will be justified by the extraction of
space and time. Of course in concrete 3D-time applications, parallelism is
without doubt of upmost importance.
[SPK]
I agree and this goes straight to the root of the idea that I
am exploring. This is why I am looking at the duality between Boolean algebras
(and their generalizations) and disconnected/scattered spaces that we see in
the Stone Representation theorem. Minds would be instances of the former and
Bodies would be instances of the latter. The trick is to see how the evolution
of these works; this is what Pratt has figured out (in basic terms).
<Emoticon1.gif> Additionally, your repeated notion that if "any empirical
difference between this arithmetical physics and the empirical physics, would
refute, not Plotinus, but the present arithmetical interpretation" requires a
means to connect or analytically continue into physical theory; "concrete
3D-time applications" are instances of the latter. By the way, the passages
that I quoted previously from Stephen Wolfram where relating to that physical
side and speak to limits on the content of individual Mechanisms; those are
what I am considering in the bisimulation model of interactions.
I am not advocating physicalism except as one side of a duality.
[BM] You mean "matter". By definition physicalism excludes that the other
part as a fundamental ontology. In a sense numbers don't exist for a
physicalist. Only a dulaist can believe in number and primitive fundamental
particle.
Your quote too much in different fields to grasp what you are trying to say.
[SPK]
Yes, bodies are included in matter, that should be obvious... Have you
read the Pratt paper, Rational Mechanics and Natural Mathematics all the way
through? He explains the idea well... I change only one thing and that has to
do with what you are thinking is a contradiction. I'll explain below.
I am against the idea that the physical (or the logical) is "all that
exists"
[BM] Make clear what are your assumption. What exist for you at the base
level.
[SPK]
Is "base level" the most primitive level? Only existence itself exists at
my base level, this level is more primitive than the hypostases of Plotinus or
Plato's Ideas. One has to have some kind of primitive ground or else we can use
the anti-foundation axiom idea (which I prefer) but you seem to resist all
attempts that I have make to understand it. I can explain the idea either way.
My statement here is directly against material monism or some form there of.
Physicalism seems to be a weak form of material monism.
and the proof of sorts that I point to is the epiphenomena problem that
both physical monism and mental/ideal monism have.
[BM] It is not symmetrical. If you believe in "only mind", you don't need to
make matter an epiphenomena given that uou have only "phenomena". You could say
"epi-ontologena", except that with "mind only" (and mechanism) we don't need
any ontology for matter, by definition.
[SPK]
Good grief Bruno! Have you read of the debate between Berkeley and Dr.
Johnson? Why are you making this so difficult? Additionally, you have not yet
explained how idealism ("only in the mind") explains for the plurality of
minds. This is why I keep bringing up the question of solipsism. This is
related to the epiphenomena problem of idealism because it offers no reason,
other than some ad hoc postulation, that there is matter. Sure, we can take the
hand waving stuff that Plotinus wrote, but is that really sufficient an
argument for you? You demand far more from me!
Moving on to the rest of your statement here. I am trying to argue for a
form of dualism. Is this not yet clear? Descartes' failed attempt at dualism
does not taint all forms of dualism, for his form depended on the notion of
substance and had no means to account for change, time and transitivity, a
failure that very often gets overlooked.
Of course we need a neutral common ground to absorb both into but that
is taken into account in terms of "in the limit of where all differences
vanish".
[BM] This is a nice poetical description of inconsistency, the limit where 1
- 0 = 0.
[SPK]
Sure, it is inconsistent as we are looking at it and that is the point
that I am trying to drive. Think of this: At the most primitive level of your
ontology, is there something that is supervening such that the notion of
differences obtains for that primitive? This goes directly to the problem of
measures and mereology that you seem to mention in passing but never seem to
speak directly about. How does the notion of differences even obtain if there
is nothing to compare to at all? This is not complicated!
Take your "only mind" ideas. Imagine your self in a completely empty
universe. How would you know what you are? You have no body. You would have no
notion of change for there is nothing to gauge any change against. What would
serve to gauge our thoughts?
Forgive me here as I am sacrificing clarity for brevity.
**
Additionally there is resent work that seems to strongly support my
crazy idea of how we might solve the measurement problem in QM (which is my
main motivation).
[BM] So you do assume QM, even QM + collapse apparently. I don't assume
anything in physics, given that the results is that physics is derivable from
arithmetic, and *has to be derived* from arithmetic if we want obtain the
qualia, and not just the quanta.
[SPK]
Yes, because I am coming from the opposite direction from you!
I assume QM
[BM] That's way too much for me. Although I believe QM is true, I estimate we
have to derive it from arithmetic. And that is the conclusion of the UDA
argument. Third person classical mechanism entails first person plural quantum
mechanism.
[SPK]
We have yet to see that entailment. You need to overcome the large body
of research showing that classical logics are insufficient to embed quantum
logics. This is the result of Svozil and others that I pointed you to.
but not "collapse" per say as the metaphysical assumptions in
"collapse" go against the Perfect Cosmological Principle. We see this in the
preferred reference frame that any objective collapse model generates. What we
need, I believe, is a model where we obtain what appears as a Collapse from a
1st person P.o.V. but is more like the Everett-Dewitt idea from the outside 3rd
person view all the while understanding that there is no special "observer"
that could perceive the latter except as an abstract notion.
**
Please see: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~abranden/icig-05-27-08.pdf
This is very much related to the work of Jean-Yves Girard in his "Geometry of
Interaction".
[BM] ? (The relation is either trivial, or is not obvious for me. Very
technical paper(s). You should stick a bit more on the idea(s) instead of
mentioning so much papers which seems to me both a bit 1004-like with respect
to the topic).
[SPK]
That paper discusses the notion of correlations in games which is
another way of looking at bisimulations between Mechanisms. From the abstract:
"Correlations arise naturally in non-cooperative games, e.g., in the
equivalence between undominated
and optimal strategies in games with more than two players. But the
non-cooperative assumption
is that players do not coordinate their strategy choices, so where do
these correlations come from?
The epistemic view of games gives an answer. Under this view, the
players’ hierarchies of beliefs
(beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . ) about the strategies played in
the game are part of the description
of a game. This gives a source of correlation: A player believes other
players’ strategy choices are
correlated, because he believes their hierarchies of beliefs are
correlated. We refer to this kind of
correlation as “intrinsic,” since it comes from variables—viz., the
hierarchies of beliefs—that are part
of the game. We compare the intrinsic route with the “extrinsic” route
taken by Aumann [2, 1974],
which adds signals to the original game."
I hoped that you might get an intuition of what I am trying to work
out by reading this paper... It seems to me that the notion of Belief that
Brandenburger et al are using would be related to your B as in Bp&p. In my idea
this manifests as simulations of simulations, etc.
[BM] If you find a precise relation, then submit it. Well, you can think
aloud for some time, but don't expect too much understanding.
[SPK]
I can be hopefull.
**
By the way, almost all of Girard's papers are inaccessible to me as I
am not in a university. I know of his work from my study of Pratt's papers.
Take a look here:
http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/Articles.html
from Girard's web page:
http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/
Best,
Bruno
[SPK]
Thanks for pointing me to that, now I have 2X reasons to learn to
read French. :P I am still thinking on how to write up the interaction idea. It
takes me time to translate pictures in my head to words on the screen.
<Emoticon10.gif>
Try to write a paper, and make it readable by some experts in the field you
cross. Or for a wider audience, on a less ambitious version.
Mechanism is compatible with matter and dualism, if it is taken in some
phenomenological view.
You can assume QM, but my point is only that we can't do that, if we assume
M. (mechanism). QM has to be justified in M through machine's self-reference
intensional nuances.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
[SPK]
I try hard to only assume those ideas that have empirical evidence
for. I will continue to work on a paper. Thank you for your comments so far.
Onward!
Stephen
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