On Apr 27, 3:08 am, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > Your position as you have described it sounds a lot like ASSA only > without taking measure into consideration. I am curious if you > believe there is any merit to counting OMs or not. Meaning, if I have > two computers and set them up to run simulations of the same mind, are > there two minds or one?
If the simulations are identical, then there is only one mind, which exists in Platonia. The information in the computer simulation is just a "shadow" of the actual platonic information. In reality, there is no objectively existing computer running a simulation. There is just your perception of this. So, ultimately, I think there's no merit in counting OMs. Every OM exists once, and only once, and they exist along a continuum where by every variation is realized. Certain types of variation from one instant to the next results in the subjective experience of the flow of time. Variations "perpendicular" to this results in the subjective feel of different personal identities. See my previous reply to Bruno today for further details on white rabbits. > Let's say I devised an evil simulation in which a mind suffers > horribly and is tortured, and I set the simulation to run each day, > and at the end of the day reset the simulation to the initial state, > such that after the first day, no new information or computations take > place, but they are repeated. If given the choice, would you unplug > the computer to stop the suffering of the mind in the computer, or > having already been simulated once would you consider it > futile/meaningless to stop it. I would consider it futile or meaningless to stop it. Even if I stopped you from running it the first time, even that would be meaningless, because the horribly suffering mind actually exists in Platonia, not in your computer simulation. Your feeling of having "caused" their suffering is an illusion. BUT, if there was no cost to me, I'd probably go ahead and stop you, just in case I'm wrong. > If the number of implementations of minds does not matter and if all > experiences already exist, then would it not be meaningless to do > anything? Everything is meaningless. BUT, as it turns out, I have no choice in the matter. My will is not free. Even if I'd like to just say, "screw it, none of this matters, I quit", I still get up every day and go to work. Why? Because I am not the master of my fate. I am not the captain of my soul. This lack of real choice (i.e., free will) is already clear from physicalism, but even more so with a version platonism where all possible experiences must be realized. But really I think we lost "meaningfulness" before we even got to platonism. > All actions, whatever the consequence would be rendered > neutral, having already happened somewhere. If no act of good or evil > matter this philosophy leads to utter fatalism. Correct. Though, utter fatalism is not necessarily as bad as it sounds. It just takes a little getting used to. > I don't consider something happening with 100% probability to be > mutually exclusive with happening more than once. The question is > whether or not that makes any difference to the observer(s?). I don't think it makes any difference to the observers if, from your perspective something happens to them 1000 times. What matters to them is how many times it happens to them from their perspective. I don't think that you having the experience of running your identical torture simulation 1000 times has any significance whatsoever for the entities being tortured. There SEEMS to be a relationship between the observer moments, but in fact there is not. In this respect it's kind of like the subjective experience of the flow of time. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
