On Sun 2019-10-27 21:40:07 -0400, Eli Schwartz wrote: > I didn't say I don't want people to use keyservers. There is no > "either" here. You don't want people to use keyservers. I want people > to use keyservers, and I want GnuPG to fix its brokenness so people > can use keyservers.
I also want GnuPG to fix its brokenness when encountering dangerous/invalid material. There are multiple things broken in the ecosystem here, and SKS is only one of them. But while GnuPG's errors are implementation errors, SKS is also broken *by design*, so we need to think about how to design better keyserver protocols. (SKS also has implementation errors, fwiw) We can think about all of these things at the same time. And, frankly, keyservers *are* problematic, in several different ways, abuse being just one of them. > I would be thrilled if people with experience in developing GnuPG would > respond to the situation by, I dunno, teaching GnuPG how to sanitize > input before blindly loading said data into an exploding parser. Have you followed the changes in the latest versions of GnuPG? There is some much more significant sanitization done on certificates retrieved from keyservers in 2.2.17. I won't say i agree with all of those changes (i've actively changed some of them in the version of GnuPG we distribute in debian, because import-clean can lead to data loss, see https://dev.gnupg.org/T4628 for details), but efforts to limit the damage that can come in from keyservers are definitely under way. > I'm curious: do you *also* feel the concerns of people who just want the > Web of Trust to work reliably? I definitely care about the network of identity assertions that people call "web of trust". I'm not convinced that it has ever worked reliably for most people or most use cases, unfortunately. i say that as a Debian developer, one of the groups that is the most heavily invested in the idea. I know Arch cares about it too. I'd love for it to be more reliable than it has been in the past, and getting that to happen requires fixing a lot of different pieces. Please, help us get them fixed! > Literally every single possible iota of messaging I've seen from > anywhere in the OpenPGP community is "the world will suddenly be perfect > if no one can attack *MY* key because of my Lord and Savior, hagrid". As > far as I can tell, it's not just missing the point, it hasn't even found > the continent where the point is hiding. This sort of rhetoric seems like it just serves to alienate you from the people who are doing the work to improve the community. I don't know anyone who thinks this, not even the folks who operate hagrid. If this is an attempt to characterize my position, it's rather inaccurate. There's a pretty broad consensus that tools should validate input, and that GnuPG needs to take more serious steps than it has in the past to defend against potentially malicious inputs. Part of this work involves understanding the incentives and risks that apply to the rest of the ecosystem, which might make them publish data that is different from data that they've published in the past, and helping GnuPG figure out how to handle that data. Or, helping other OpenPGP implementations that aren't GnuPG become easier to use, so that people can move to a different implementation if they don't think that GnuPG takes these concerns as seriously as they'd like it to. I welcome your help in getting these things fixed! All the best, --dkg
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