Big Fat Nevermind.
On 05.06.2025 11:42, Eliot Lear wrote:
I think there’s some confusion (and maybe it’s mine) with regard to when a TLV is permitted. The Table in 4.3.2 suggests that a PKCS#10 TLV can only be sent as a response. But as the peer may do so in an unsolicited fashion (e.g., with a certificate request), it can be sent as a request. Similarly, a PKCS#7 TLV is likely to be sent as a response in any case.I am not sure we should simply reverse these fields. I am a little concerned that we’ll end up in some deadlocked situations. I think it’s safe to say that if the client isn’t requesting anything but needs to respond, it’s using a response, but in all other instances. I’m also a little uncomfortable with requests and responses being unprotected, while the content is. That may represent a reveal. I don’t think that can be fixed in this version, tho.In any case, at least for the time being, I propose that the table be updated as follows:0-1 0-1 0-10PKCS#7 0-1 0-100PKCS#10 Eliot _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list --emu@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email toemu-le...@ietf.org
OpenPGP_0x87B66B46D9D27A33.asc
Description: OpenPGP public key
OpenPGP_signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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