On Dec 30, 2024, at 12:44 PM, Oleg Pekar <oleg.pekar.2...@gmail.com> wrote:
> "The second use-case for EAP-TLS in Phase 2 is where both the user and
> machine use client certificates for authentication. Since TLS permits
> only one client certificate to be presented, only one certificate can
> be used in Phase 1."
> 
> How are we going to figure out whether this certificate in Phase 1
> belongs to the user or to the machine? Since we can't send
> Identity-Type TLV during TEAP tunnel establishment.

  Why not?  Identity-Type can be used as an Outer TLV, and Section 2.3 defines 
Outer TLVs as:

...
This term is used to refer to optional TLVs outside the TLS tunnel, which are 
only allowed in the first two messages in the TEAP protocol. That is the first 
EAP-server-to-peer message and first peer-to-EAP-server message
...

  Which leads me to conclude that it should be possible.  The peer sends EAP 
Request / Identity.  The server replies with TEAP and Outer TLVs.  The peer 
replies with TEAP and Outer TLVs, including Identity-Type.

  And double-checking the document, it looks there is no example of sending 
Identity-Type as an outer TLV.

  Checking some client implementations, it looks like they don't send Outer 
TLVs.  But they do process the Outer TLVs sent by the server in the first TEAP 
message from server to peer.

>> Change 2
>> Clarify "Limitations on inner methods" section.  This change has no impact 
>> on the protocol or implementations, and is editorial.
> "Implementations SHOULD limit the permitted inner EAP methods to a
> small set such as EAP-TLS and the EAP-FAST-MSCHAPv2 variant of
> EAP-MSCHAPv2."
> 
> There is a benefit in positioning TEAP as a framework for other EAP
> methods to be used inside the tunnel. Since TEAP RFC defines exactly
> the integration of any inner method it looks sure enough to allow any
> inner method to run inside. I understand the motivation to suggest
> only methods that were thoroughly tested by the community and most of
> them support keys generation. However such a sentence could be
> off-putting implementers.

  I'll clarify.  Jouni also pointed out that because EAP-TLS works, it is 
highly likely that other EAP types work so long as they derive MSK and EMSK.

  Alan DeKok.

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