This should be disregarded. RPK is a TLS certificate type. See the IANA
registry for TLS Certificate Types:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml#tls-extensiontype-values-3.
Specifically, TLS Certificate Type value of 2 corresponds to RPK (raw
public key). In TLS, the RPK is even carried in the Certificate message.
See RFC 8446:
enum {
X509(0),
RawPublicKey(2),
(255)
} CertificateType;
struct {
select (certificate_type) {
case RawPublicKey:
/* From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo */
opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
case X509:
opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
};
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateEntry;
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;
--Mohit
On 9/4/24 18:24, RFC Errata System wrote:
The following errata report has been submitted for RFC9190,
"EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3".
--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfc-editor.org%2Ferrata%2Feid8094&data=05%7C02%7Cmohit.sethi%40aalto.fi%7Ce3e0578f596b470ab10f08dcccf59f89%7Cae1a772440414462a6dc538cb199707e%7C1%7C0%7C638610602544992133%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=79%2BtrIbEI8hXB1TD0SxYqsAoRBTo0Wq0jMOaYSwZgjI%3D&reserved=0
--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: Eliot Lear <l...@lear.ch>
Section: 2.1.1
Original Text
-------------
Certificates can be of any type supported by TLS including raw
public keys.
Corrected Text
--------------
Certificates can be of any type supported by TLS. Raw public keys may
also be used.
Notes
-----
A raw public key specifically is **not** a certificate.
Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". (If it is spam, it
will be removed shortly by the RFC Production Center.) Please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
will log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
--------------------------------------
RFC9190 (draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-21)
--------------------------------------
Title : EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the Extensible Authentication Protocol
with TLS 1.3
Publication Date : February 2022
Author(s) : J. Preuß Mattsson, M. Sethi
Category : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source : EAP Method Update
Stream : IETF
Verifying Party : IESG
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