Question for implementors:
To enable revocation checking in situations where EAP-TLS peers do
not implement or use OCSP stapling, and where network connectivity is
not available prior to authentication completion, EAP-TLS peer
implementations MUST also support checking for certificate revocation
after authentication completes and network connectivity is available.
Does anyone do this? and if they do it, are they using OCSP to do it? And what state is a connection in *while* they do it?
Eliot
OpenPGP_0x87B66B46D9D27A33.asc
Description: OpenPGP public key
OpenPGP_signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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