Hello,

We published a new draft titled “Post-Quantum Cryptography enhancement in 
EAP-AKA prime” : draft-ar-emu-pqc-eapaka-00 - Post-Quantum Cryptography 
enhancement in EAP-AKA prime 
(ietf.org)<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ar-emu-pqc-eapaka/>

This draft aims to enhance the security of EAP-AKA' FS by making it 
quantum-safe.

Comments and suggestion are welcome.

Regards,
Aritra.

From: internet-dra...@ietf.org <internet-dra...@ietf.org>
Date: Monday, 4. March 2024 at 12:47
To: Tirumaleswar Reddy.K <kond...@gmail.com>, Aritra Banerjee (Nokia) 
<aritra.baner...@nokia.com>, Tirumaleswar Reddy <kond...@gmail.com>
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ar-emu-pqc-eapaka-00.txt

CAUTION: This is an external email. Please be very careful when clicking links 
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A new version of Internet-Draft draft-ar-emu-pqc-eapaka-00.txt has been
successfully submitted by Aritra Banerjee and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:     draft-ar-emu-pqc-eapaka
Revision: 00
Title:    Post-Quantum Cryptography enhancement in EAP-AKA prime
Date:     2024-03-04
Group:    Individual Submission
Pages:    12
URL:      https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ar-emu-pqc-eapaka-00.txt
Status:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ar-emu-pqc-eapaka/
HTML:     https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ar-emu-pqc-eapaka-00.html
HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ar-emu-pqc-eapaka


Abstract:

   Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for
   Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' FS) is specified in
   [I-D.ietf-emu-aka-pfs], providing updates to [RFC9048] with an
   optional extension that offers ephemeral key exchange using the
   traditional Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key
   agreement algorithm for achieving perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
   However, it is susceptible to future threats from Cryptographically
   Relevant Quantum Computers, which could potentially compromise a
   traditional ephemeral public key.  If the adversary has also obtained
   knowledge of the long-term key and ephemeral public key, it could
   compromise session keys generated as part of the authentication run
   in EAP-AKA'.

   This draft aims to enhance the security of EAP-AKA' FS making it
   quantum-safe.



The IETF Secretariat

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