Hi Alan

I think it's good to consider what's going on on both sides here.  At the beginning, both the identity and the role of the device in a network may be unknown, and so a certain access is given.  After bootstrapping has occurred (however that happens), then both the role of the device and the identity is established. If the role of the device changes, then a COA seems appropriate where possible, or otherwise a Radius Disconnect.

I don't think EAP Failure should ever really be contemplated during a housekeeping operation *unless* an intermediate-success is first generated, because otherwise we can bet that at least some clients will take that as a signal that the house keeping operation failed, and they'll loop retrying.

Under the hood, housekeeping operations that update credentials are just updating entries in one or more tables that index to the same device as before, and so absent a change in role of the device, one shouldn't expect much in the way of a change of authorization policy.  There's one BIG exception: expired credentials.  Here again, this is server-side policy that might involve sandboxing the device, setting the result to EAP Failure in a request action TLV, opening a trouble ticket, firing an employee, or some such.

Let's also consider the crypto here.  The session key that was derived from a full authentication is still valid for resumption so long as one trusts the keying material to not have been observed/obtained.  That is independent of the cert/user password update taking place.

What I'm getting at is that house keeping operations are MOSTLY independent of authorization decisions (excluding expired credentials).

Coming back to your wording:

If the identity changes, as with some provisioning flows. the server SHOULD 
cause the EAP peer to re-authenticate.  This reauthentication can be done by 
returning an EAP Failure in order to cause the client to reconnect, or via a 
RADIUS Disconnect-Request packet after authentication, or change the 
authorization via a RADIUS CoA-Request, via other means.  This reauthentication 
is done in order to ensure that the user or device is accessing the network not 
only with the correct credentials,

My suggestion would be something along the lines of the following:

Under normal circumstances, house keeping operations should complete and the EAP connection SHOULD successfully complete.  If a change of authorization is required for some reason, the server SHOULD make use of a Radius COA, and not involve the peer so as to not impose excess operations on the peer (or itself).  In exceptional circumstances, a Radius-Disconnect MAY be used as a signal to a client directly after such operations to disconnect and authenticate with the new updated credentials.

Regards,

Eliot

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