The IESG has received a request from the EAP Method Update WG (emu) to consider the following document: - 'Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' FS)' <draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-11.txt> as Informational RFC
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the last-c...@ietf.org mailing lists by 2023-08-01. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to i...@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract Many different attacks have been reported as part of revelations associated with pervasive surveillance. Some of the reported attacks involved compromising the smart card supply chain, such as attacking Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) card manufacturers and operators in an effort to compromise long-term keys stored on these cards. Since the publication of those reports, manufacturing and provisioning processes have received much scrutiny and have improved. However, resourceful attackers are always a cause for concern. Always assuming a breach, such as long-term key compromise, and minimizing the impact of breach are essential zero trust principles. This document updates RFC 9048, the improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3GPP Mobile Network Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA'), with an optional extension providing ephemeral key exchange. Similarly, this document also updates the earlier version of the EAP-AKA' specification in RFC 5448. The extension EAP-AKA' Forward Secrecy (EAP-AKA' FS), when negotiated, provides forward secrecy for the session keys generated as a part of the authentication run in EAP-AKA'. This prevents an attacker who has gained access to the long-term key from obtaining session keys established in the past, assuming these have been properly deleted. In addition, EAP-AKA' FS mitigates passive attacks (e.g., large scale pervasive monitoring) against future sessions. This forces attackers to use active attacks instead. The file can be obtained via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs/ The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3097/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3098/ _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
