This update changes from using https://chris-wood.github.io/draft-tls-extensible-psks/draft-group-tls-extensible-psks.html to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-08 as recommended by Chris Wood, as he is not currently progressing draft-group-tls-extensible-psks.
As Dan outlined at IETF113 https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/113/materials/minutes-113-emu-01, draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-02 proposed using https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jhoyla-tls-extended-key-schedule-03 and was reviewed at TLS WG IETF110. TLS WG suggested using derived PSKs and RFC 8773 instead. draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-03 changed from using draft-jhoyla-tls-extended-key-schedule to using derived PSKs and RFC 8773 instead, was reviewed at TLS WG IETF111, and the approach was validated by EKR https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/111/materials/minutes-111-tls-00. -----Original Message----- From: internet-dra...@ietf.org <internet-dra...@ietf.org> Sent: Thursday 26 May 2022 21:02 To: Dan Harkins <daniel.hark...@hpe.com>; Owen Friel (ofriel) <ofr...@cisco.com> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-05.txt A new version of I-D, draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-05.txt has been successfully submitted by Owen Friel and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp Revision: 05 Title: Bootstrapped TLS Authentication Document date: 2022-05-26 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 10 URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-05.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp/ Htmlized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-05 Abstract: This document defines a TLS extension that enables a server to prove to a client that it has knowledge of the public key of a key pair where the client has knowledge of the private key of the key pair. Unlike standard TLS key exchanges, the public key is never exchanged in TLS protocol messages. Proof of knowledge of the public key is used by the client to bootstrap trust in the server. The use case outlined in this document is to establish trust in an EAP server. The IETF Secretariat _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
