Looks ok to me.
> On Dec 15, 2020, at 21:54, RFC Errata System <rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org> > wrote: > > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5216, > "The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol". > > -------------------------------------- > You may review the report below and at: > https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfc-editor.org%2Ferrata%2Feid6357&data=04%7C01%7CBernard.Aboba%40microsoft.com%7Cfd18c37634264d91633508d8a186ee08%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C0%7C0%7C637436948647284983%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C2000&sdata=JmTH%2BEcw1ksnycAeZyqgtUyJcpv3%2FtMF0zQp1gCMqQo%3D&reserved=0 > > -------------------------------------- > Type: Editorial > Reported by: Benjamin Kaduk <ka...@mit.edu> > > Section: 5.1 > > Original Text > ------------- > [3] Section 5 of BCP 86 [RFC3766] offers advice on the required RSA > or Diffie-Hellman (DH) module and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) > subgroup size in bits, for a given level of attack resistance in > bits. For example, a 2048-bit RSA key is recommended to provide > 128-bit equivalent key strength. The National Institute of Standards > and Technology (NIST) also offers advice on appropriate key sizes in > [SP800-57]. > > Corrected Text > -------------- > [3] Section 5 of BCP 86 [RFC3766] offers advice on the required RSA > or Diffie-Hellman (DH) modulus and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) > subgroup size in bits, for a given level of attack resistance in > bits. For example, a 2048-bit RSA key is recommended to provide > 128-bit equivalent key strength. The National Institute of Standards > and Technology (NIST) also offers advice on appropriate key sizes in > [SP800-57]. > > Notes > ----- > RSA and DH computations are parameterized by their moduli, with singular > "modulus" (not "module"). > > Instructions: > ------------- > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. > > -------------------------------------- > RFC5216 (draft-simon-emu-rfc2716bis-13) > -------------------------------------- > Title : The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol > Publication Date : March 2008 > Author(s) : D. Simon, B. Aboba, R. Hurst > Category : PROPOSED STANDARD > Source : EAP Method Update > Area : Security > Stream : IETF > Verifying Party : IESG _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
