Hi Yaron,

The existing text is just about restricting the mandatory to implement
cipher suites.  Are you OK with the text?   

Thanks,

Joe

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:emu-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Yaron Sheffer
> Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2010 11:05 PM
> To: Alan DeKok
> Cc: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] review of draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-04
> 
> Hi Alan,
> 
> Initial provisioning by shipping the device with the trust anchor pre-
> installed is fine, if you're Verizon. But in many cases you don't
control
> the device, and don't have a trusted path through which to transport
the
> CA cert (I am thinking enterprise CA here, not a public CA). The
> combination of anonymous tunnel plus mutual auth with a one-time
password
> allows you to do that.
> 
> But I'm OK with not making this option mandatory, since there are
> important use cases that don't need it.
> 
> Thanks,
>       Yaron
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Alan DeKok [mailto:al...@deployingradius.com]
> > Sent: Thursday, March 04, 2010 8:47
> > To: Yaron Sheffer
> > Cc: emu@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [Emu] review of draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-04
> >
> > Yaron Sheffer wrote:
> > > Joe, what Dan is proposing is a reasonable way to use a one-time
> > password for the initial provisioning of a trust anchor. Initial
> > provisioning is important for many types of deployments. Does the
> > document allow an alternative secure way to do that?
> >
> >   TLS-based methods can leverage server certificates.  This is
already
> > done in other areas (WiMAX, etc.)
> >
> >   i.e. ship a device with a known CA, and on first provisioning, TLS
> > checks the server certificate, and the user validates that the name
of
> > the server is what was expected.
> >
> >   Since the document doesn't forbid anonymous methods, the only
issue
> > here is whether or not the document should make them mandatory to
> > implement.  I agree with Joe, in that they shouldn't be mandatory.
> >
> >   Alan DeKok.
> >
> > Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.
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