It seems to me, the consistency between EAP peer and EAP Server can be caused 
by the Lying NAS 
Even this NAS is not malicious authenticator who impersonates another 
authenticator, this NAS should 
be a stupid NAS or malfunctional NAS who make a mistake for some reason. 
Because this NAS distributes
inconsistent data to the peer and server respectively. 

>From this aspect, the lying NAS can be understoond as ill NAS. am I right?
On the other hand, as described in the section 5.3.3, 
"
it is possible for a  first-hop AAA proxy to detect a AAA client attempting to 
impersonate
another authenticator.
"
Based on this, impersonation issue seems to overlap with channel binding or 
lying NAS issue.

Regards!

-Qin
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Bernard Aboba" <bernard_ab...@hotmail.com>
To: <emu@ietf.org>
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2009 1:42 PM
Subject: [Emu] Impersonation and Lying NAS problem: two distinct issues (with 
different solutions)


> Dan Harkins said:
> 
> "When there are 3 parties involved in this 2 party protocol it is
> justified by saying that the EAP server trusts the NAS so there is no
> security issue when MSK is disclosed to it. But what NAS identity does
> the EAP server trust? The peer and EAP server derive a shared key and
> for the key to be disclosed to another entity the peer and EAP server
> must have a consistent view of the identity of that entity. If they cannot
> arrive at a consistent view of all identities then the protocol deriving
> the key fails. That is not an authorization issue, it's an authentication
> issue."
> 
> RFC 5247 Section 5.3.2 describes problems that can result from a NAS 
> impersonating another NAS.   Section 5.3.3 describes the Channel
> Binding problem, which is logically distinct. 
> 
> As noted in Section 5.3.2, it is not possible for a AAA server more
> than one hop from the NAS to verify the NAS Identity.  This verification
> must be handled at the first hop proxy. 
> 
> Given this, it will typically be outside the scope of a Channel Binding
> Implementation to address the impersonation issue.  
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu

Reply via email to