> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On 
> Behalf Of Katrin Höper
> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2008 8:22 AM
> To: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: [Emu] Review of Requirements for a Tunnel Based EAP Method
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I have problems with some of the cryptographic binding claims 
> in the curent document (draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-00.txt)  
> and would like to discuss them on the list.
> Basically it is about claiming cryptographic bindings for 
> MitM protection even if the inner method(s) does not derive keys.
> 
> Section 3.1 Password Authentication
> "The tunnel method MUST meet this use case. However, it MUST 
> NOT expose the username and password to untrusted parties and 
> it MUST provide protection against man-in-the-middle and 
> dictionary attacks."
> 
> KH: How is the last MUST possible? The considered password 
> authentication methods typically do not derive keying 
> material. As result, the cryptographic binding key has only 
> the tunnel key as input, i.e. no actual binding is provided. 
> Consequently, MitM attacks are still feasible.
> The only way to ensure that MitM attacks are prevented for 
> inner method that do NOT derive keys is to enforce a policy 
> that does not allow those EAP methods to be executed outside 
> a tunnel. However, this is a policy and cannot be ensured by 
> a tunnel-based EAP method itself.
> 
[Joe] What we want to say is that the tunnel itself MUST provide MitM 
protection and MUST not weaken any MitM protection provided by an inner method. 
 


> Section 3.2 Protect Weak EAP Methods
> "The tunnel method MUST support protection of weak inner 
> methods and protect against man-in-the-middle attacks  
> associated with tunneled authentication."
> 
> KH:Same comment as above. If the EAP methods does not derive 
> a key -> no binding takes place. If the key exchange is weak 
> and can be broken by an MitM during the protocol execution, 
> the attack still succeeds.
> Again only enforcing  a security policy can prevent these attacks.
> 
[Joe] Same text as above.  Protection from MitM offered by the tunnel method 
combined with an inner method MUST NOT be worse than the inner method run 
outside the tunnel. 

> I don't know how to address this problem since a candidate 
> tunnel method cannot enforce policies.
> However, the MUST statements cannot be met as stated in the 
> current draft.
> 
> Any thoughts???
> 
> Regards,
> Katrin
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