1. intro

reference for PEAP is missing, too bad the drafts have expired...

3.8 resource constrained environments

This is a bit a fuzzy paragraph. I feel that the SHOULD here invites for developing 'weaker' methods in order to satisfy this goal. I would prefer to leave this out altogether. As an alternative you might want to describe a situation in which the use of a weaker method may be mitigated by reducing the services that are made available to these resource challenged devices.

4.2.1.4 peer identity privacy

just username is too limited, all credentials need to be protected, and arguably all attributes of a user.

4.4 EAP Channel Binding Requirements

Such attacks...., in which key channel binding characteristics are transported....

I think it is not the 'key channel binding characteristics' that are transported but rather the 'service characteristics'. I prefer the wording in clancy-emu-chbind:

" [...] a process in which the EAP client provides
   information about the characteristics of the service provided by the
   authenticator to the AAA server protected within the EAP method,
   allowing the server to verify the authenticator is providing valid
   information to the peer.  The server can also respond back with
   additional information that could be useful for the client to decide
   whether or not to continue its session with the authenticator."

4.5 Requirements associated with carrying usernames/passwords

OTP is not a password database.

4.5.1.2 authentication of server

I don't think it is as important to protect the username as the password.

4.5.1.3 server credential revocation checking

Perhaps with the exception of the Grid community there is no use of OCSP (let alone SCVP) as far as I know, and popular implementations of SSL don't implement it. I understand the requirement but I am afraid this is too restrictive and may be prohibitive for implementers. I would suggest changing the MUST to SHOULD and leave out the paragraph about OCSP and SCVP.

4.6.3 cryptographic binding with TLS tunnel

expand CTK, MSK, EMSK, TEK

expand "domino effects"
_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu

Reply via email to