Gene Chang said:
Dan,
I am not sure I am able to clearly understand the end result you seek.
It seems there is a clear consensus for a tunneled method. Are you
pushing for the addition of a tunneled method?
Ok... I am easily baited. What would you like to see to achieve more
than a snail race? I am assuming we both believe the term "snail race"
is a pejorative. Thus I ask you, how do we do better?
I clearly hear your comment that there have been a paucity of
comments,
if nothing else, simply to affirm we are on track. I agree with the
proposed charter. I am open to a discussion to add a non-tunneled
method
if there is sufficient demand. A non-tunneled method does not seem to
promise enough features for the use cases that interest me.
Gene
Hi Gene,
You did not specify what the uses that interest you are, and I don't
know about the use cases that interest Dan either, but I can speak for
the use cases that interest me.
EAP has been used in several cases as a magic way to use legacy
credentials in protocols. I'll cite three examples:
1. L2TP/IPsec (RFC 3193) as implemented by Microsoft, Apple, Cisco and
others, where an EAP method is used to authenticate the user.
2. IKEv2 (RFC 4306) where EAP is used to magically authenticate the
initiator using non-cert and non-PSK credentials.
3. TEE (draft-nir-tls-eap-03) where EAP is used to authenticate the
user.
In all three cases EAP is used by a protocol inside an encrypted
tunnel, where the server, which is either trusted by the authenticator
or co-located with it is already authenticated by a certificate or
PSK. IMO EAP was used in all cases an some magical way of making
passwords into a secure authentication mechanism. The problem is that
there really is no publicly available EAP method for passwords.
Tunneled methods don't really make sense here. There's no benefit in
putting a TLS tunnel inside an IKEv2 exchange just to pass the
password. Something like EAP-SRP would be great if it (a) existed and
(b) didn't have all that IPR baggage. The method that Dan is proposing
would also be beneficial here, if we could get a WG behind it so we
can get some solid security review. Instead, what implementors are
doing is EAP-MD5 or EAP-GTC, which don't quite meet the requirements
for any of the above protocols.
Yoav
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