On 2026-03-07 at 03:16 +1100, "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <[email protected]> 
wrote...
> On 2/2/26 12:36, Jordan Niethe wrote:
> > Introduction
> > ------------
> > 
> > The existing design of device private memory imposes limitations which
> > render it non functional for certain systems and configurations where
> > the physical address space is limited. 
> > 
> > Limited available address space
> > -------------------------------
> > 
> > Device private memory is implemented by first reserving a region of the
> > physical address space. This is a problem. The physical address space is
> > not a resource that is directly under the kernel's control. Availability
> > of suitable physical address space is constrained by the underlying
> > hardware and firmware and may not always be available. 
> > 
> > Device private memory assumes that it will be able to reserve a device
> > memory sized chunk of physical address space. However, there is nothing
> > guaranteeing that this will succeed, and there a number of factors that
> > increase the likelihood of failure. We need to consider what else may
> > exist in the physical address space. It is observed that certain VM
> > configurations place very large PCI windows immediately after RAM. Large
> > enough that there is no physical address space available at all for
> > device private memory. This is more likely to occur on 43 bit physical
> > width systems which have less physical address space.
> > 
> > The fundamental issue is the physical address space is not a resource
> > the kernel can rely on being to allocate from at will.  
> > 
> > New implementation
> > ------------------
> > 
> > This series changes device private memory so that it does not require
> > allocation of physical address space and these problems are avoided.
> > Instead of using the physical address space, we introduce a "device
> > private address space" and allocate from there.
> > 
> > A consequence of placing the device private pages outside of the
> > physical address space is that they no longer have a PFN. However, it is
> > still necessary to be able to look up a corresponding device private
> > page from a device private PTE entry, which means that we still require
> > some way to index into this device private address space. Instead of a
> > PFN, device private pages use an offset into this device private address
> > space to look up device private struct pages.
> > 
> > The problem that then needs to be addressed is how to avoid confusing
> > these device private offsets with PFNs. It is the limited usage
> > of the device private pages themselves which make this possible. A
> > device private page is only used for userspace mappings, we do not need
> > to be concerned with them being used within the mm more broadly. This
> > means that the only way that the core kernel looks up these pages is via
> > the page table, where their PTE already indicates if they refer to a
> > device private page via their swap type, e.g.  SWP_DEVICE_WRITE. We can
> > use this information to determine if the PTE contains a PFN which should
> > be looked up in the page map, or a device private offset which should be
> > looked up elsewhere.
> > 
> > This applies when we are creating PTE entries for device private pages -
> > because they have their own type there are already must be handled
> > separately, so it is a small step to convert them to a device private
> > PFN now too.
> > 
> > The first part of the series updates callers where device private
> > offsets might now be encountered to track this extra state.
> > 
> > The last patch contains the bulk of the work where we change how we
> > convert between device private pages to device private offsets and then
> > use a new interface for allocating device private pages without the need
> > for reserving physical address space.
> > 
> > By removing the device private pages from the physical address space,
> > this series also opens up the possibility to moving away from tracking
> > device private memory using struct pages in the future. This is
> > desirable as on systems with large amounts of memory these device
> > private struct pages use a signifiant amount of memory and take a
> > significant amount of time to initialize.
> 
> I now went through all of the patches (skimming a bit over some parts
> that need splitting or rework).

Thanks David for taking the time to do a thorough review. I will let Jordan
respond to most of the comments but wanted to add some of my own as I helped
with the initial idea.

> In general, a noble goal and a reasonable approach.
> 
> But I get the sense that we are just hacking in yet another zone-device
> thing. This series certainly makes core-mm more complicated. I provided
> some inputs on how to make some things less hacky, and will provide
> further input as you move forward.

I disagree - this isn't hacking in another/new zone-device thing it is cleaning
up/reworking a pre-existing zone-device thing (DEVICE_PRIVATE pages). My initial
hope was it wouldn't actually involve too much churn on the core-mm side.

It seems that didn't work quite as well as hoped as there are a few places in
core-mm where we use raw pfns without actually accessing them rather than using
the page/folio. Notably page_vma_mapped in patch 5.

But overall this is about replacing pfn_to_page()/page_to_pfn() with
device-private specific variants, as callers *must* already know when they
are dealing with a device-private pfn and treat it specially today (whether
explicitly or implicitly). Callers/callees already can't just treat a
device-private pfn normally as accessing the pfn will cause machine checks and
the associated page is a zone-device page so doesn't behave like a normal struct
page.

> We really have to minimize the impact, otherwise we'll just keep
> breaking stuff all the time when we forget a single test for
> device-private pages in one magical path.

As noted above this is already the case - all paths whether explicitly or
implicitly (or just fogotten ... hard to tell) need to consider device-private
pages and possibly treat them differently. Even today some magical path that
somehow gets a device-private pfn/page and tries to use it as a normal page/pfn
will probably break as they don't actually correspond to physical addresses that
actually exist and the struct pages are special.

So any core-mm churn is really just making this more explicit, but this series
doesn't add any new requirements.

My bigger aim here is to use this as a stepping stone to removing device-private
pages as they just contain a bunch of redundant information from a device driver
perspective that introduces a lot of metadata management overhead.

> I am not 100% sure how much the additional tests for device-private
> pages all over the place will cost us. At least it can get compiled out,
> but most distros will just always have it compiled in.

I didn't notice too many extra checks outside of the migration entry path. But
if perf is a concern there I think we could move those checks to device-private
specific paths. From memory Jordan did this more as a convenience. Will go look
a bit deeper for any other checks we might have added.

 - Alistair

> -- 
> Cheers,
> 
> David

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