On Fri, Aug 08, 2025 at 01:11:20PM +0200, Jacek Lawrynowicz wrote: > Fix potential Spectre vulnerability in repoted by smatch: > warn: potential spectre issue 'vdev->hw->hws.grace_period' [w] (local cap) > warn: potential spectre issue 'vdev->hw->hws.process_grace_period' [w] (local > cap) > warn: potential spectre issue 'vdev->hw->hws.process_quantum' [w] (local cap) > > The priority_bands_fops_write() function in ivpu_debugfs.c uses an > index 'band' derived from user input. This index is used to write to > the vdev->hw->hws.grace_period, vdev->hw->hws.process_grace_period, > and vdev->hw->hws.process_quantum arrays. > > This pattern presented a potential Spectre Variant 1 (Bounds Check > Bypass) vulnerability. An attacker-controlled 'band' value could > theoretically lead to speculative out-of-bounds array writes if the > CPU speculatively executed these assignments before the bounds check > on 'band' was fully resolved.
You do know that debugfs access is restricted to root access only, so spectre issues are the least of your worries if you have root :) That being said, no real objection from me for this, but there's probably a metric-ton of these in other debugfs files if you want to start whacking away at them... thanks, greg k-h
