On Mon, Jul 27, 2026 at 9:23 AM Bas Westerbaan <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Mon, Jul 27, 2026 at 2:52 PM Shumon Huque <[email protected]> wrote: > >> A new validator implementation could unilaterally impose that rule, sure. >> >> But ideally, there should be some general rule for algorithm downgrade >> resistance that is signaled in the protocol, >> > > We can write a more general rule for sure [1], but why does the > authoritative need to signal it (besides the existence of the DS itself)? > If there is no clear use case, we shouldn't do it: if we keep it simpler > it's easier to reason about the security. > > Best, > > Bas > > > [1] A validator should insist on a signature with algorithm A if the > availability of A is signalled by the existence of the corresponding DS and > A has more confidence in the security of A than the other available > algorithms. We can do the same if it's not one preferred, but a couple are > equipreferable. > I think there is still an assumption in the DNSSEC specs that local validator policy always wins. I sense your suggestion is along those lines. To date, the general rules in the current DNSSEC specs are designed to maximize interoperability and not rely on individual resolver operators to make their own determinations about things like this. multi-alg-rules is already skirting this by proposing universal algorithms. Determining confidence in or strength of algorithms and acting selectively on it is another topic, which has had some heated discussions in DNSSEC in the past. Shumon.
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