I welcome that this draft opens a really needed topic in DNS. Problems
with rapidly retrying clients whose queries lead to errors are real and
painful for many DNS operators.
However, I don't see how this solution can work. As the draft even
acknowledges, the attacker can spoof the error+TTL response, since the
crafted SOA (or whatever RR type) can't be DNSSEC-secured.
Even when the TTL would be (upper bounded to) several seconds, can't the
attacker simply DoS anything easily by repeatedly poisoning the cache
with error+TTL?
Libor
On 19. 06. 26 12:19, Philip Homburg wrote:
Something that came up a couple of times, in the context of DELEG and
the NS . proposal, is that there is no way for a server to indicate how
long DNS errors (other than NXDOMAIN) can be cached.
I created a small draft to add a SOA record to the addional section. In
the current version, all processing is entirely optional. Please let
me know if this would be useful.
-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-homburg-dnsop-dettl-00.txt
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 03:13:28 -0700
From: [email protected]
To: Philip Homburg <[email protected]>
A new version of Internet-Draft draft-homburg-dnsop-dettl-00.txt has been
successfully submitted by Philip Homburg and posted to the
IETF repository.
Name: draft-homburg-dnsop-dettl
Revision: 00
Title: Add TTLs to DNS errors
Date: 2026-06-19
Group: Individual Submission
Pages: 4
URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-homburg-dnsop-dettl-00.txt
Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-homburg-dnsop-dettl/
HTML: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-homburg-dnsop-dettl-00.html
HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-homburg-dnsop-dettl
Abstract:
When a DNS server replies an error other than NXDOMAIN, there is no
mechanism to specify how long this error can be cached by the
recepient. This document introduces a mechanism where a server can
specify the time to live (TTL) of an error by adding a SOA record to
the additional section of a reply. Clients can use this TTL at their
discretion. In particular, clients can limit the TTL to a maximum
value, impose a minimum value or just ignore the TTL value all
together.
The IETF Secretariat
_______________________________________________
DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
_______________________________________________
DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]