The suggested text seems inoffensive to me as well, but we may also want to
expand it to cover the recursive-to-authoritative path for resolvers
associated with the client. (ie, just using DoH to your home router isn't
going to help when it uses Do53 to the authorities.).
On the topic of DNSSEC, it's worth noting that rfc9460 (for SVCB) has some
text there as well which provides some recommendations.
Some of those were general and were intended to provide some degree of
coverage for the ECH use-case (before this was
split out to its own draft).
I do share the concerns that Enterprise environments are going to need to
be able to disable ECH.
That seems out of the scope of this draft, and it seems like they could do
this in a few ways:
* Stripping SVCB/HTTPS RRs entirely
* Removing (or replacing) ech entries from the SVCB/HTTPS RRs, especially
if used along with devices that do terminating TLS MitM.
* Managed device client-side policy configured as part of the OS/client
environment.
None of these are in the remit of the IETF or things we want to be
standardizing, so seem out of scope here,
and also none of them truly defend against hostile/compromised clients that
ignore the enterprise policies
and are trying to establish covert channels. It seems like leaving things
on this front out of the draft is preferable.
Erik
On Fri, Oct 4, 2024 at 11:37 AM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:
>
>
> On 10/4/24 16:09, Salz, Rich wrote:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-svcb-ech/pull/16 "Discuss
> > the impact of resolver selection on security"
>
> That suggested text seems inoffensive to me fwiw.
>
> S.
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