Hello.
I think dprive fits the encryption topic better than dnsop? Anyway,
some quick thoughts below.
On 15/08/2024 00.06, Vint Joseph wrote:
using UDP and only one or two packets
I suspect that larger answers will be... a complication.
You could rely on UDP fragmentation, but in that case the amplification
is unpleasant, as I don't expect a way of validating the client's IP.
And fragmented UDP often can't pass through anyway IIRC, especially on
IPv6. (replay-ability might be OK) Or would there be fallback on
another encrypted protocol?
Crypto-agility: you assume that the client knows a public key, i.e. that
implies the algorithm already. In that case, you'd have a key that's
hardcoded in configuration and basically never rotated? Or you'd use
some different transport to get the key by name? (e.g. unencrypted DNS
with DNSSEC validation, but such bootstrapping isn't very simple) Or a
more complicated handshake in case the key isn't known?
Overall I fear that a simple solution won't be able to give good
properties, unless you just don't care about "edge cases". I wouldn't
standardize yet another transport unless it can be shown to give some
"significant advantage".
--Vladimir | knot-resolver.cz
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