Brian Dickson wrote:
Are there anyone who still think DNSSEC were cryptographically secure
or had protected TLDs more securely than diginotar?
I'm not sure why "thinks" enters into the conversation.
You may replace it with "dreams".
The facts are what matters here:
The important facts are that:
DNSSEC is not cryptographically secure.
DNSSEC "at the TLD level and higher", which
include root zone, is only as trustworthy
as diginotar.
Taken together, this means that as long as there exists any CA which
is weaker than some TLD, that automatically means that as a global
system, DNSSEC is more cryptographically secure than WebPKI.
First, "CA" is terminology not specific to WebPKI, whatever
it means, but PKI in general including DNS. That is, a DNSSEC
TLD is a CA.
Second "any CA which is weaker than some TLD" means not
"cryptographically weaker" but "operationally/physically
weaker". As such, your conclusion can only be "DNSSEC is
more operationally/physically secure than WebPKI"
Third, all the CAs, including TLDs, pursuing commercial
success have very good appearance using such words as
"HSMs" or "four eyes minimum". That is, you can't
compare actual operational/physical strength from
their formal documents.
Remember:
At the TLD level and higher, this involves HSMs and physical
access restrictions using a "four eyes minimum" approach. > Not surprisingly,
diginotar was equally strongly secure.
Masataka Ohta
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