On Thu, 30 Jul 2020, Joe Abley wrote:
The .org is definately what I would call a
delegation-only domain. Now let's examine the corner case you have
and see if/what we can do.
OK. Note that it's not a corner case, however; there are many thousands of
examples of this and although I haven't examined every single serial that has
ever been published, it seems entirely plausible that that there has never been
an ORG zone published since 2002 which has been delegation-only.
50 domains in a few million is a corner case :) But let's not drift
into language here. I understand your point in that you always have a
few of these in the .org zone.
So you are saying that if ns1.example.org serves another-example.org
and example.org is suspended for abuse, that you will still service
A records for ns1.example.org and NS records for another-example.org
containing ns1.example.org but no NS records for example.org? In
the hopes that another-example.org keeps working?
That also seems quite imprecise. Here's a more specific worked example to make
sure we understand each other.
$ORIGIN ORG.
BADDOMAIN NS ...
BADDOMAIN NS ...
NS1.BADDOMAIN A 192.0.2.1
GOODDOMAIN NS NS1.BADDOMAIN.ORG.
GOODDOMAIN NS ...
If BADDOMAIN.ORG is suspended (or if the domain is suppressed for some
equivalent reason) then the zone cut betwen ORG and BADDOMAIN.ORG will be
removed (the BADDOMAIN.ORG NS set will disappear) but the A record above will
remain, since it is linked to another domain, GOODDOMAIN.ORG, that depends upon
it. Without a zone cut, that makes the ORG servers authoritative for the A
record.
That is exactly what my "quite imprecise" text said :)
Although please clarify what you do if there are DS records for
BADDOMAIN.ORG and/or GOODDOMAIN.ORG
To a certain extent, this behaviour is a consequence of (a) the venerable
operaetional need to suspend domains because they have been implicated in abuse
and (b) the EPP data model used in the ORG registry, which itself has its
origins in the RRP data model used before the re-delegation of ORG to PIR in
2002. As such, it's tempting to assert that the behaviour is a contractual
requirement shared with all other gTLDs that are operated subject to the same
contract that exists between PIR and ICANN, hence my question about
applicability.
Wouldn't that already fail with DNS servers like unbound with:
harden-glue: yes
harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
harden-below-nxdomain: yes
harden-referral-path: yes
which is the default in Fedora / RHEL / CentOS and maybe others?
If so, that sounds like a problem with Fedora/RHEL/CentOS. To the best of my
knowledge, this has been the way that ORG has operated for the past 18+ years.
Clearly not many people are querying for BADDOMAINS.ORG, or they are
afraid to contact you?
Also, you seem to claim that it is normal and accepted that one should
trust unsigned glue records from a parent for your delegation and that
confirming these records at the child is something that you count on
people not doing?
Seems like .org needs to update an 18+ year old operation policy, and
just to clarify that has nothing to do with this draft as .org already
has this problem.
Paul
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