On Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 5:48 PM, Ted Lemon <mel...@fugue.com> wrote: > On Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 8:33 PM, Marek Vavruša <mvavr...@cloudflare.com> > wrote: >> >> > You say that your proposal does not impact DoT's ability to address the >> > threat model or use case that is the reason it is being used. But this >> > is >> > doesn't make sense to me. The trust model for DoT and DoH right now is >> > that they are configured by the user for the user's reasons, or by the >> > service provider for the service provider's reasons. You are proposing >> >> This is the issue that the draft is trying to solve. The service >> provider doesn't have a way >> to configure DoT on the stub resolver. This problem is described in >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8310#section-6.7 >> What I'm trying to address more specifically is >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8310#section-7.3 > > > The document explicitly says that it doesn't have a trust model for DHCP. >> >> >> The "DHCP authentication" does exist, I believe you're referring the >> deployment status. > > > No, I'm referring to it doesn't exist. There is no deployable DHCP > authentication. The DHC working group tried to come up with one, and > ultimately concluded that it was not worth it, because the only thing that > should ever be trusted from a DHCP server is information about the local > network. DoH and DoT are out of scope for DHCP according to this > reasoning. Bear in mind that we were more optimistic about authentication > when we did RFC 3315. RFC 8415, which is in AUTH48, and which supersedes > RFC3315, is not as optimistic, and only provides for authentication using > IPsec between server and relay, and authentication for the purpose of doing > Reconfigure; this authentication is not sufficient to provide assurances of > trustworthiness. It's about as secure as a TCP sequence number. > >> >> I'm happy if we say the draft must depend on RFC3315, or discuss the >> trustworthiness of the responses, >> but surely there must be a way forward if we want to keep the >> recursive DNS (last mile) decentralized and free from tampering. > > > There is a way forward: seriously figure out the threat model. Tom > Pusateri and another author already did a DHCP document; the reason we > didn't advance it is that we weren't able to come up with a threat model > where configuring DoT or DoH made sense. Until someone does that, there is > no point in doing further work on a DHCP option. If we do do further work > on a DHCP option, Tom's document is more complete than yours.
Can you share the link for the draft for a reference? Marek _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
