> On 20 Jul 2018, at 10:37 pm, George Michaelson <g...@algebras.org> wrote: > > The intent (to me at least) is to be able to use exterior fetch, *not* > DNS, to source this as a file. curl. wget. ncftp. rsync.
Nothing in this proposal stops these transport mechanisms. > the "thing" is a file object. It almost certainly is in near-canonical > sort order already. Its a stream of characters, probably in > bind-normal form. Which is basically DNSSEC order. > If you can compute the path through the labels and the chain of NSEC > regions and the expected hadda-yadda-dadda.. you don't *need* a > digest. The difference between METAMD and XHASH is that you do XHASH in smaller chunks on such a ordered zone and verify each chunk as you go through. > If you have a digest, and its already in near canonical order, then > *cost* to compute "is the file exactly as the publisher wrote it" is > low. And, since its a signature under the ZSK, its not just "its as > the publisher said" its "the publisher knows the ZSK" which is strong > enough to say: "just load it" > > So, I ask: is this incremental method applicable to this model? Yes > Sure, works for giant zone. What about a root zone? Do I need this? Yes, it works for the root zone. > Also.. glue. Yes it hashes glue and delegating NS record. > -G > > On Fri, Jul 20, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Mark Andrews <ma...@isc.org> wrote: >> Rather than having a full zone hash this can be done as a chain >> of hashes (XHASH). >> >> The XHASH would include all records at a signed name (where a signed >> name is NOT an NSEC3 name) up until the next signed name (where a >> signed name is NOT a NSEC3 name) in DNSSEC order similar to ZONEMD. >> If there is a NSEC3 record and its RRSIGs in this range it is included >> in the hash computation. Where a NSEC3 record matches the name of a >> record that exists in the zone it is hashed with that name. The record >> type appears at both top and bottom of zone similar to NS. >> >> The chain is only deemed to be complete if there is a hash record at >> the zone apex. This allows for incremental construction and destruction >> of the XHASH chain similar to the way the presence of NSEC at the zone >> apex indicates that chain is complete. >> >> If there are records that are not at or under the zone apex they are included >> in the final XHASH of the zone sorting from the zone apex to the end of the >> namespace then from the start of the namespace to the zone apex. Such records >> at not normally visible to queries other than AXFR/IXFR. AXFR/IXFR permit >> such >> records. >> >> XHASH would allow for UPDATE to incrementally adjust the chain without >> having to hash the entire zone at once. >> >> XHASH would allow for a slave server to verify a zone is still complete >> after a IXFR by just checking the areas of the zone impacted by the IXFR. >> >> e.g. >> >> example.com SOA >> example.com NS ns.example.com >> example.com DNSKEY … >> example.com NSEC a.example.com NS SOA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY XHASH >> example.com XHASH … >> >> a.example.com NS ns.a.example.com >> a.example.com NSEC b.example.com NS RRSIG NSEC XHASH >> a.example.com XHASH … >> ns.a.example.com A … >> >> b.example.com NS ns.b.example.com >> b.example.com NSEC ns.example.com NS RRSIG NSEC XHASH >> b.example.com XHASH … >> ns.b.example.com A … >> >> ns.example.com A … >> ns.example.com AAAA … >> ns.example.com NSEC example.com A AAAA RRSIG NSEC XHASH >> ns.example.com XHASH … >> >> Each of the groupings shows which records plus RRSIGs that are >> included in the XHASH calculation. >> >> To prevent removal/introduction of RRSIGs of XHASH records a DNSKEY >> flag bit is be needed to indicate which RRSIG(XHASH) should/should not >> be present once the chain is complete. The same applies to RRSIG(ZONEMD). >> >> Verification of a AXFR would be slightly slower than with ZONEMD as there >> are more RRSIG records to be processed, >> >> >> -- >> Mark Andrews, ISC >> 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia >> PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: ma...@isc.org >> >> _______________________________________________ >> DNSOP mailing list >> DNSOP@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop -- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: ma...@isc.org _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
