On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 08:22:03AM -0400,
 Paul Wouters <p...@nohats.ca> wrote 
 a message of 57 lines which said:

> We have just submitted a draft aimed at increasing the security of
> the DNSSEC with respect to the power that parental zones have over
> their children.

I'm opposed to this idea.

> While the root and TLD zones are asumed to be almost exclusively
> delegation-only zones,

This is unrelated. You mix two different things, the administrative
issue and the technical one (every subdomain in its own zone). gouv.fr
is administratively a delegation from .fr but is in the same zone.

> the root zone operator (or any level higher in the hierarchy than
> the target victim) could briefly remove the NS and DS records, and
> create a "legitimate" DNS entry for "www.example.org"

That's the DNS. It is a tree. Protecting childs against the parent is
a non-goal, or otherwise we should move to some alternative to DNS
(Namecoin is cool).

> The aim here is to counter the argument that the root key and TLD
> keys are all powerful and under government control, and can therefor
> never be trusted.

I've read the draft and still can understand nothing in this sentence.

> 2) Allow the creation of DNSSEC transparency logs

May be mentioning draft-zhang-trans-ct-dnssec would be nice?

>  The DELEGATION_ONLY flag has a strong overlap in functionality with
>  the Public Suffix List as both signal a formal split of authority
>  between parent and child.

May be mentioning the defunct DBOUND working group would be a good
idea?

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