> On 28 Feb 2017, at 21:35, Paul Wouters <p...@nohats.ca> wrote: > > On Tue, 28 Feb 2017, Roy Arends wrote: > >> Since the last update of this draft, a full collision has been found. >> >> Do the authors intend to update the draft to state that SHA1 SHOULD NOT be >> used for DNSSEC signing (DNSKEY algorithm 5,6,7) and for DNSSEC Delegation >> (DS and CDS algorithm 1) ? > > That seems a bit dramatic to this author :) > > We can't stuff PDF prefixes into this,
We don’t need to. > there are a lot less bytes > for an attacker to play with. A CNAME chain will give you plenty of bytes to futz with. > >> Please also refrain from using MUST- SHOULD+ and SHOULD-. > > For this SHA1 case or in general? In general. > I'd say we could update the DNSSEC > Signing entry from MUST- to SHOULD NOT Good. That is exactly my request. > but I would leave SHA1 for > DNSSEC validation at MUST-. I’d say you have to update that as well to SHOULD NOT. > There is a need to move people away from SHA1, Yes, there is. Roy _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
