On Tue, 4 Aug 2015, Ted Lemon wrote:

On Aug 4, 2015, at 12:35 PM, Donald Eastlake <d3e...@gmail.com> wrote:
      There is nothing in this draft about the server maintaining state
      other than its small server secret.

I know that.   The problem is that in order to avoid the negative consequences 
of DNS cookies when they are not widely implemented, you have to maintain state.

I don't see that, despite you bringing this up a few times.

The server sends back a packet with cookie request and completely forgets
about the query. There is no state.

The confusion is introduced by the term "negative consequences of DNS
cookies when they are not widely implemented". If the client fails
to understand the packet, and it is a legitimate client, it will ask
again. If it is a botnet, it never sees the answer (and asks again anyway
because it is doing a a DDOS). If the legitimate client would not get
an answer because the server is about to topple over, it would also ask
again. So I do not understand what these "negative consequences" are.

However, if a client does understand cookies and the server receives
back a cookie, it can give that request a higher preference and answer
it in favour of sending cookie requests to clients that did not send
requests with cookies.

Paul

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