> Ray Bellis <mailto:ray.bel...@nominet.org.uk> > Wednesday, January 21, 2015 1:30 AM > > TCP/53 is already persistent, it just happens most clients don't take > advantage of that feature.
if they did, then those initiators would either be a DoS from the responder's point of view, or a DoS from other initiators' points of view. we are a prisoner to the reasonable expectations of the billions of devices that were created in the decades-long era of RFC 1034 section 4.2.2. > > The point of my draft is to permit signalling that the current > connection should _not_ be persisted ;-) i know. but the arrow of change does not point in that direction. HTTP/0.9 was responder-close, and was thus able to be changed in HTTP/1.1 to initiator-close unless and only unless "Connection: close" was specified. even if changing TCP/53's connection semantics could be done without creating new DoS vectors, the small number of DNS TCP initiators and responders who will ever be upgraded, would be able to adopt TCP/80 faster. many middleboxes assume that DNS is UDP-only, and a few no doubt proxy the transaction in a way that hijacks the connection management semantics in a way that would (a) pass your new signalling along, but (b) not follow it. -- Paul Vixie
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