I think the document should also include the risk of cache inspection. An eavesdropper with access to the same recursive cache as the victim can examine the cache to get a picture of the DNS queries the victim(s) performed and when based on the TTL of cached RRsets. While the attacker can't say for sure which user made the query just from the cache contents, it does provide a trail of what DNS queries the user has been making. This is a bigger risk in open resolvers for a WiFi hotspot, etc. and not that useful with large caches like an ISP.
There are some early papers on the risks back from 2004 http://cs.unc.edu/~fabian/course_papers/cache_snooping.pdf Scott On Nov 11, 2013, at 7:25 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: > This new I-D started in perpass but may be better here. It has two > parts, analyzing the privacy problems with the DNS, and suggesting > possible solutions, some of them not changing the protocol and > therefore may be a possible work item for this group. > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bortzmeyer-perpass-dns-privacy > > _______________________________________________ > DNSOP mailing list > DNSOP@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop =================================== Scott Rose NIST scott.r...@nist.gov +1 301-975-8439 Google Voice: +1 571-249-3671 http://www.dnsops.gov/ =================================== _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
