Scott
----- Original Message -----
From: "Scott Rose" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <dnsop@ietf.org>
Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2008 4:07 AM
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Proposed changes to RFC 4641: rollovers
On Sep 29, 2008, at 7:46 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
any KSK can be used as a TA. there is no way to know -
unambigiously -
that any given KSK is not being used as a TA in some validator.
however, your assertion that at KSK should -never- be rolled unless
compromise is known or strongly suspected is -BAD- from an operational
and liklely from a trust perspective.
your selection of 12-13 months and 25 years are suspect. Can you
provide
the underlaying bias for these tiemframes?
That is actually the NIST recommendations in SP 800-57 part 1 Public
keys used for authentication should have a use lifetime of 1-2 years,
but can be kept around a little longer to validate pre-existing
signatures after that period.
Scott
What do you mean "Kept Around" - those keys need to be re-creatable through
some Key Recovery Proces. especially since the master DNS Root is a direct
piece of US Government Property until the NTIA MOU is codified in a formal
conveyance of those Intellectual Properties. Yes I am talking about the MOU
that NTIA wrote under Nancy Victory Esq's hand several years ago.
That said, since DNS Lookups and the records of them are key pieces of
'evidence of activity' on the Internet or as a part of a larger private
secure IP Network mand stem from a US Government owned DNS Root, the Root
and its operations are constrained by FISCAM and the requiremensts of FISMA
here...
So let me ask this, rather than ignoring the obvious why not look the use of
DNS as a process to resolve an address and the handshaking processes in
DNSSec provide the security model therein to meet the existing rules of
evidence and step from there to the platform of needing to create culpable
digital evidence that will meet the Presiding Court requirement's of any
Nation willing to rely on this service???
This has ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to do with technology, it has to do with Social
Process and that is the key win. We need logging of DNS Lookups that meets
the reliable evidence requirement's put in place by the US Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Todd Glassey
--bill
On Sun, Sep 28, 2008 at 09:14:34PM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote:
In the last paragraph of 3.1.1, remove the last sentence ("Although,
given a long enough key..."). Replace it with the following
paragraphs:
There are two schools of thought on rolling a KSK that is not a
trust anchor:
- It should be done regularly (possibly every few months) so that
a key rollover remains an operational routine.
- It should only be done when it is known or strongly suspected
that the key has been compromised in order to reduce the
stability issues on systems where the rollover does not happen
cleanly.
There is no widespread agreement on which of these two schools of
thought is better for different deployments of DNSSEC. There is a
stability cost every time a non-anchor KSK is rolled over, but it
is possibly low if the communication between the child and the
parent is good. On the other hand, the only completely effective
way to tell if the communication is good is to test it
periodically. Thus, rolling a KSK with a parent is only done for
two reasons: to test and verify the rolling system to prepare for
an emergency, and in the case of an actual emergency.
Because of the difficulty of getting all users of a trust anchor to
replace an old trust anchor with a new one, a KSK that is a trust
anchor should never be rolled unless it is known or strongly
suspected that the key has been compromised.
Remove the first paragraph of 3.3; it is now covered in 3.1.1 (and it
was wrong about the cryptography).
Change the second paragraph of 3.3 to:
From a purely operational perspective, a reasonable key effectivity
period for KSKs that have a parent zone is 13 months, with the
intent to replace them after 12 months. An intended key
effectivity period of a month is reasonable for Zone Signing Keys.
This annual rollover gives operational practice to rollovers.
Ignoring the operational perspective, a reasonable effectivity
period for KSKs that have a parent zone is 25 years or longer.
That is, if one does not plan to test the rollover procedure, the
key should be effective essentially forever, and then only rolled
over in case of emergency.
In the first paragraph of 4.2, replace the first two sentences with:
Regardless of whether a zone uses periodic key rollovers in order
to practice for emergencies, or only rolls over keys in an
emergency, key rollovers are a fact of life when using DNSSEC.
--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium
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Scott Rose
NIST
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
ph: +1 301-975-8439
http://www-x.antd.nist.gov/dnssec
http://www.dnsops.gov/
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