On Oct 1, 2018, at 10:49 AM, Tony Finch <[email protected]> wrote: > > Paul Hoffman <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Oct 1, 2018, at 8:50 AM, Tony Finch <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Paul Hoffman <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> During earlier discussions of opportunistic encryption in the IETF, >>>> attempted-but-not-required authentication was strongly preferred over >>>> "don't even attempt to authenticate". >>> >>> This is only worthwhile if there is downgrade protection, i.e. the client >>> needs to be able to tell if it is supposed to be able to rely on an >>> authentication mechanism (e.g. using DANE). Without downgrade protection >>> it's equivalent to encryption without authentication. >> >> We have to be careful when we are talking about recursive resolvers. By >> "client" above, I think you mean "customer of the recursive resolver" >> and not "the side of the recursive resolver talking to authoritative >> servers". > > No, I'm thinking in terms of client = recursive, server = authoritative, > which are the ends of the connection that we want to improve.
I do not have a scenario where the client (the resolver in this case) needs downgrade protection for privacy. We have no privacy now. If we start having privacy, there might be resolvers who only want to send queries that are private, but that feels like a different DNS than what we have today. --Paul Hoffman
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