On 21.10.13 02:52, David Conrad wrote:
On Oct 20, 2013, at 2:16 PM, Vernon Schryver <v...@rhyolite.com> wrote:
Should the people working on DNS implementations prioritize making
their DNSSEC code more robust and easier to use above or below
addressing your issues?
I'd say "below".

Resolver operators (hopefully) want to protect their caches.  DNSSEC will do 
that, but only if people are signing their zones. There are lots of external 
parties (e.g., registries, registrars, software developers, resolver operators, 
etc) to get DNSSEC deployed and there remains very little incentive for anyone 
to sign their zones, regardless of how robust and easy it might be made.


There is only one thing, that can influence wider deployment of something on Internet and this is the shame, combined with envy. Making browsers claim loud and clear "this site is not protected by DNSSEC, you may be viewing something else, beware!", similar to what (some) browsers do for SSL certificates can help big time. It also more or less will drive the validation-closer-to-the-app setups.

Surely, this will "wreak havoc", in having all those parties in the business hurry to implement DNSSEC or answer uneasy customer questions.

Considering how trivial this feature is to implement, one has to wonder why it has not happened until now? Perhaps stepping on someone's toes?

By the way, I agree with both you and Vernon, that such research should prominently state, that the ultimate solution of this kind of bugs is deploying DNSSEC --- and that it should also mention that deploying DNSSEC yourself will not automatically cure all known diseases, so you should put pressure on your peers to do so as well. Setups that clearly create more vulnerabilities should be exposed as well, including bad vendor practices and documentation.

Daniel
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