Paul Hoffman wrote: > On Aug 22, 2013, at 2:47 PM, David Conrad <d...@virtualized.org> wrote: > >> A resolver operator deploying an NTA is making an assertion that data behind >> a name is safe despite protocol indications that is may not be. > > Where is that stated? I ask, because it would seem that a better description > would be that they are asserting that the data behind a name is unprotected > by DNSSSEC.
agreed, and that's why, over and above the absurd engineering economics behind it, i don't like NTA. if my signatures don't work because i've been attacked (for example, one of my name servers has been compromised), the last thing i'd want is comcast telling their customers that the data they're getting from my compromised name server is ok to consume because it's unsigned. madness test: would we have bothered with DNSSEC at all, back in the day, if NTA had been known as a definite requirement? vixie
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