In 2017, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) had various crypto libraries examined as part of a project.

Three software projects were shortlisted and subjected to more in-depth analysis: the LibreSSL developed by OpenBSD, the NSS developed by Mozilla, and the library Botan.

The development of Botan was subsequently financially supported by the BSI, found deficiencies were corrected and improved the test suite. The results of this development have been incorporated into Botan and have been published with version 2.0.1. In the meantime, some documents have also been published in a Github repository by Rohde & Schwarz (https://github.com/Rohde-Schwarz-Cybersecurity/botan/tree/master/doc/bsi). What was not published: the original detailed study, and in particular the results it contained in relation to the other crypto libraries.

Golem.de has asked the developers of the two libraries LibreSSL and Mozilla's NSS, which were examined, but ultimately not selected for the project: The developers of LibreSSL knew nothing of the project, the request to Mozilla remained unanswered.

They have read the document. Information about spectacular security holes can not be found in it. Nevertheless, it could be helpful for the developers of the respective libraries, because in many places are very concrete suggestions on how the code could be improved, including an estimate of how much effort that would be. For example, there are references to compiler warnings and an assessment of their severity, as well as a list of errors in the state machines of the TLS handshake implementation and hints on where the code should be better protected against timing attacks.

In the case of Botan, these recommendations were implemented, but for the other libraries studied, it would certainly make sense to make the results at least available to the developers.

But even if the BSI does not want to have published the comparison of crypto libraries: Anyone who wants to read it, can even make a request for the Freedom of Information Act, for example via the portal Fragdenstaat.de (https://fragdenstaat.de/anfrage/sicherheitsaudits-des-projekts-sichere-implementierung-einer-allgemeinen-kryptobibliothek/) or informally by writing to the BSI. You do not have to justify such a request.

Jochen
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