On 12/6/2021 9:38 AM, Scott Kitterman wrote:
In the interests of future-proofing, should there ever be additional
underlying authentication protocols, I propose this:

Should any authentication failures for systems
under the Domain Owner's control be found in the reports, in cases
where the failures are caused by local misconfiguration or omission
the Domain Owner can take steps to address such failures.
I think that's good.

Sorry, but I think it's not.

1.  A specification should specify.  It should specify things that are concrete, precise, reliably actionable, and generally produce the same understanding across widely differing readers. Specification language that does not satisfy the list in the preceding sentence is not a specification.  Rather it is commentary.

2. When a specifications says that something vague and operational is allowed or not allowed, consider whether it would be meaningful to switch the bit.  The above text is saying that local problems are allowed to be fixed by taking local action. Could it make sense here to prohibit taking that action?  I sure hope not.  So this text is, really, entirely gratuitous.  It purports to be saying something useful, but it isn't.

3. IETF specification culture is quite nice in also allowing commentary about background or use or 'issues' with the specification.  The downside is that this often produces text that is, really, none of the things listed in the preceding sentence. Rather, it is language that might feel comfortable to the authors but has no practical utility.


On 12/6/2021 5:35 AM, Todd Herr wrote:

    SPF normally fails on forwarding.  Should we mention that?


I don't know if it's necessary. SPF breaking due to forwarding is a well-known condition, and I don't think it has to be documented in every text that mentions SPF.

Kudos for that point.

4. Duplication of specification details or commentary text invites divergence and/or misunderstanding. Sometimes a caution is helpful, not not when it is long-standing issue with another specification and is already well-understood.  To the extent that there is a continuing concern about the reader's understanding the fact of the caution, there should be a basic pointer, early in the specification, to material that discusses this (other) specification.


The problems here come from good intentions, but from the problematic view that adding bits of vague or redundant text will provide meaningful protection against the points of concern.  They won't.

d/

--
Dave Crocker
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