But just as an example, suppose I'm trying to get to a position to use
p=reject, but some bad actor doesn't want me to do that so they can keep
phishing me. All they have to do is keep sending forged message reports
from gmail which makes me think I've got a problem. Seriously, this is
not rocket science.
Mike
On 1/25/21 9:25 AM, Seth Blank wrote:
Mike, how do you believe DMARC reports are consumed and utilized? I
think you have a misunderstanding here which is why you're going down
this path and everyone else is pushing back.
On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 9:22 AM Michael Thomas <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Taking in information from unauthenticated sources and acting on
it is an operational problem per se. Have we learned nothing in
the last 30 years?
Mike
On 1/25/21 9:19 AM, Seth Blank wrote:
What operational problem are we solving here? Absent evidence of
a problem and strong consensus on the solution, let's close these
tickets and move on.
On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 9:10 AM Douglas Foster
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Since the status quo is unauthenticated, I wonder if adding a
signing requirement will help.
Will recipients discad unsigned messages, or accept whatever
is available to maximize their information capture? I
suspect they will conrinye to accept everything.
I think we would need an identified threat before recipients
would be motivated to discard.
But what about John's problems with receiving reports that
should not have gone to him? I did not understand the root
cause, but I would hope there is something that can be done.
Would signing help receiving sites, those with less
sophistication than he has, be able to sort out noise more
effectively?
On Mon, Jan 25, 2021, 11:51 AM Michael Thomas <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 1/25/21 8:44 AM, Todd Herr wrote:
On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 10:18 AM Michael Thomas
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
The main thing I've learned over the years of
dealing with security is to not underestimate what a
motivated attacker can do. Your imagination is not
the same as their imagination. Closing #98 in
particular is absolutely ridiculous: the report
should already have a DKIM signature or SPF so it's
just a matter of making sure its valid. Why would
you *not* want to insure that? The amount of
justification for *not* having the receiver
authenticate it is a mountain. The amount of effort
to authenticate it is trivial for mail. Levine's
dismissal of security concerns because he has
anecdotal "evidence" from a backwater domain carries
no weight at all.
That's all well and good, but you haven't answered the
question I asked.
What threats do you have in mind? Put another way, how
do you envision an attacker exploiting the lack of
authentication in a DMARC report to his or her gain?
No, sorry, the onus is on the people who don't think it
can be gamed. A bald assertion that it can't be gamed is
very unconvincing. You need to lay out a miles long case
for why it cannot be gamed. And to what end? #98 has a
simple piece of text that should be added to DMARC to
eliminate the possibility of forgery. You'd need a 10
page threat I-D to explain why it's not necessary. What
is the point of that? For email, it's trivial to prevent
forgeries. Why would anybody argue against that?
Mike
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