#31466: A potential improvement in the Django template filter `escapejs`
---------------------------------+--------------------------------------
Reporter: Phithon | Owner: Phithon
Type: New feature | Status: closed
Component: Template system | Version: 3.0
Severity: Normal | Resolution: wontfix
Keywords: escapejs | Triage Stage: Unreviewed
Has patch: 0 | Needs documentation: 0
Needs tests: 0 | Patch needs improvement: 0
Easy pickings: 0 | UI/UX: 0
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Changes (by felixxm):
* status: assigned => closed
* resolution: => wontfix
Comment:
Replying to [comment:5 Claude Paroz]:
> Are you aware that in the example you provided, the `\*` and `*/` parts
are **not** passed to `escapejs`?
They pass `q=*/(alert(1))/*` so in a clever way we end with a valid JS:
{{{
<script>
/*
function example() {
query = '*/(alert(1))/*';
}
*/
</script>
}}}
Replying to [ticket:31466 Phithon]:
> Oops, A XSS vulnerability is introduced. The attackers can trigger
arbitrary javascript execution by the request
`escapejs` **does not** make the string safe for use in HTML or JavaScript
template literals, see
[https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/3.0/ref/templates/builtins/#escapejs
documentation]. It only protects you from syntax errors when using
templates to generate JavaScript/JSON. I agree with Claude.
See related #29055.
--
Ticket URL: <https://code.djangoproject.com/ticket/31466#comment:6>
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