#31412: database timing attack against sessions
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Reporter: Brian May | Owner: nobody
Type: Bug | Status: new
Component: contrib.sessions | Version: 3.0
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Triage Stage: Unreviewed
Has patch: 0 | Needs documentation: 0
Needs tests: 0 | Patch needs improvement: 0
Easy pickings: 0 | UI/UX: 0
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Comment (by Brian May):
Replying to [comment:2 Simon Charette]:
> Looking at
[https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/7fecaee81f59926b6e1913511c90650e76673b38
Rack patch] I think this might have a bit of overlap with #21076
([https://github.com/django/django/pull/8736 PR]). If session ID were
hashed it wouldn't be possible to use timing attacks on the btree-index to
statistically walk your way to a valid session ID. It might be time to
revive that old PR.
Agreed.
The Rack solution become complicated because (a) they wanted to preserve
existing sessions and (b) for reasons I don't understand they decided to
split the session id into a "public" session id and a "private" session id
where the names "public" (meaning non-hashed id) and "private" (meaning
hashed id) don't mean what you might expect (they both need to remain
secret).
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Ticket URL: <https://code.djangoproject.com/ticket/31412#comment:3>
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