On 2/4/14 7:18 PM, Tom Perrine wrote: > I know where I keep mine, but I'm not sure I've been paranoid enough > the past few years :-)
I'm surprised that there has been no talk on this subject yet. Perhaps
everyone with an opinion on the subject is too paranoid to reveal their
key storage process? :-/
> Where do you store your GPG keyring? Personal or business laptop? Home
> or other server? USB or other removable media? In the cloud?
I presume that you mean your GPG secret keyring. Your public keyring is
less sensitive, unless you are worried about someone knowing what keys
you might use, or if you have unpublished public keys.[1]
Never in "The Cloud." I'd be very reluctant to store my secret keyring
on network-shared media, let alone in a cloud controlled by anyone else,
no matter how secure they swore that it is.
Mine is on the laptop that accompanies me almost everywhere I go. The
laptop belongs to my employer, although in the event of a separation I
am confident that they will grant me the opportunity to clean off my
personal data before turning it in.[2]
> And more importantly, how did you decide where to keep your keyring?
Inertia/convenience mostly. Some assessment of what the consequences of
my key being compromised are. It is a lot of work to "do it right" and
at present, the cost of my key being compromised[3] is relatively low.
Other than the validity of my signatures on other people's keys, and the
signatures on my email, I don't think I've encrypted many messages that
will cause murder and mayhem if decrypted.
I like the idea of storing the secret key material on a
password-protected, encrypted USB key, but I think the risk, for me
personally, of losing the key is considerably higher than the other
risks of compromise.[4]
The tradeoff is that I'd like to be able to sign email messages when I
need to without going through a special dance to install and activate
the external media, which would either slow me down, or discourage me
from signing messages. Also, when receiving an encrypted message I'd
have to go through the dance to decrypt the message.
> At the moment, I keep my keyring on my laptop (with a backup
> elsewhere). The machine itself has whole disk encryption, and then
> there's the login password, and then keyring passphrase. All the
> passwords (phrases) are of a more than usual length and complexity. I
> think I've got a pretty good handle on this, but I know some folks who
> keep their keyrings on USB drives (often encrypted), and only plug
> them in when needed.
>
> So, anyone want to share? Am I paranoid enough, or too much?
It does depend on your threat model, and the cost of compromise of the
keys in the keyring. For a code-signing key for software distributions,
I would use a non-networked computer with a read-only operating system,
store the secret keyring on an encrypted, password-protected device that
otherwise lives in a safe or safety-deposit box. Yes, it would be a PITA
to generate a signature for every new release, especially if they were
frequent, but this warrants some extra pain.
Some PGP users have a "low security" or "everyday use" key and then a
"high security" key. The high security key would be used for generating
signatures and receipt of very sensitive encrypted data, and would be
stored and used with a greater level of precaution than the everyday use
key for signing and decrypting routine email messages.
_rob_
[1] So there is (very?) small additional risk to publishing a public key
where anyone can get it: it is much harder to attempt a cryptanalysis
attack against a keypair if you don't have the public key. As with most
things, it is a balancing act between usability and security. A
published key makes it easier for someone to communicate with you
without previous contact, based on the WoT of key signatures or sheer
necessity (When the message is "Dude, your server is hacked and
attacking our network" I am inclined to forego the usual precautions of
identity validation before encrypting to a key). If you are storing in
your public keyring someone else's keys that should not be published,
then maybe treating both keyrings equally is appropriate.
[2] The more worrisome scenario would be if the laptop is lost or stolen
or out of my control for an extended period of time due to unplanned
hospitalization, for example. I haven't given any thought to the "I'm
completely dead" scenario.
[3] Presuming that I am aware of the compromise. If my laptop was
compromised, a copy of the keyring was made, and a keystroke logger
installed that captured my passphrase, then I am "attached by an
inclined plane wrapped helically around an axis."
[4] If I had a USB key that would only unlock in contact with my
thumbprint, and self-destruct if it was not unlocked after 30 days or
so, that would be a good solution.
--
Rob Jenson -- Systems Administrator ∪ Archivist
Center for Hellenic Studies, Harvard University
rjenson{AT]chs.harvard.edu ; ferthalangur{AT]gmail.com ;
rbj_gpg{AT]spotch.com
OpenPGP Key: pub 4096R/86EF0FF0 2013-10-23 [expires: 2017-10-23]
Key fingerprint = 9152 5B82 35DD 718F 3D52 CD4C 1D3A A60C 86EF 0FF0
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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