The commit is pushed to "branch-rh9-5.14.0-427.44.1.vz9.80.x-ovz" and will
appear at g...@bitbucket.org:openvz/vzkernel.git
after rh9-5.14.0-427.44.1.vz9.80.19
------>
commit fc4a07295cdf335abfdd1a13646b6862c9ebc2d8
Author: Sabrina Dubroca <sdubr...@redhat.com>
Date: Thu Apr 11 10:04:27 2024 +0200
ms/xfrm: fix a data-race in xfrm_gen_index()
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-31751
commit 3e4bc23926b83c3c67e5f61ae8571602754131a6
Author: Eric Dumazet <eduma...@google.com>
Date: Fri Sep 8 18:13:59 2023 +0000
xfrm: fix a data-race in xfrm_gen_index()
xfrm_gen_index() mutual exclusion uses net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock.
This means we must use a per-netns idx_generator variable,
instead of a static one.
Alternative would be to use an atomic variable.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in xfrm_sk_policy_insert / xfrm_sk_policy_insert
write to 0xffffffff87005938 of 4 bytes by task 29466 on cpu 0:
xfrm_gen_index net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1385 [inline]
xfrm_sk_policy_insert+0x262/0x640 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2347
xfrm_user_policy+0x413/0x540 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:2639
do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x1317/0x2ce0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:943
ipv6_setsockopt+0x57/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1012
rawv6_setsockopt+0x21e/0x410 net/ipv6/raw.c:1054
sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3697
__sys_setsockopt+0x1c9/0x230 net/socket.c:2263
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2274 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2271 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2271
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
read to 0xffffffff87005938 of 4 bytes by task 29460 on cpu 1:
xfrm_sk_policy_insert+0x13e/0x640
xfrm_user_policy+0x413/0x540 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:2639
do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x1317/0x2ce0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:943
ipv6_setsockopt+0x57/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1012
rawv6_setsockopt+0x21e/0x410 net/ipv6/raw.c:1054
sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3697
__sys_setsockopt+0x1c9/0x230 net/socket.c:2263
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2274 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2271 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2271
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0x00006ad8 -> 0x00006b18
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 29460 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted
6.5.0-rc5-syzkaller-00243-g9106536c1aa3 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 07/26/2023
Fixes: 1121994c803f ("netns xfrm: policy insertion in netns")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkal...@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eduma...@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klass...@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herb...@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herb...@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klass...@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sdubr...@redhat.com>
https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-101702
(cherry picked from CentOS Stream commit
1a178039befae55a1518ce39da04e221b60b8544)
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khorenko <khore...@virtuozzo.com>
Feature: fix ms/xfrm
---
include/net/netns/xfrm.h | 1 +
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 6 ++----
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h
index bd7c3be4af5d..423b52eca908 100644
--- a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct netns_xfrm {
struct list_head policy_all;
struct hlist_head *policy_byidx;
unsigned int policy_idx_hmask;
+ unsigned int idx_generator;
struct hlist_head policy_inexact[XFRM_POLICY_MAX];
struct xfrm_policy_hash policy_bydst[XFRM_POLICY_MAX];
unsigned int policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_MAX * 2];
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index aa7f6615ecc5..2f615a3cc70b 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -1375,8 +1375,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_hash_rebuild);
* of an absolute inpredictability of ordering of rules. This will not pass. */
static u32 xfrm_gen_index(struct net *net, int dir, u32 index)
{
- static u32 idx_generator;
-
for (;;) {
struct hlist_head *list;
struct xfrm_policy *p;
@@ -1384,8 +1382,8 @@ static u32 xfrm_gen_index(struct net *net, int dir, u32
index)
int found;
if (!index) {
- idx = (idx_generator | dir);
- idx_generator += 8;
+ idx = (net->xfrm.idx_generator | dir);
+ net->xfrm.idx_generator += 8;
} else {
idx = index;
index = 0;
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