>> 1. cap_sys_admin check is unfortunate. In discussions about Oren's
>> patchset we've agreed that not having that check from the outset forces
>> us to consider security with each new patch and feature, which is a good
>> thing.
>
> Removing CAP_SYS_ADMIN on restore?
we've kept the capabilities in our patchset but the user tools doing checkpoint
and restart are setcap'ed appropriately to be able to do different things like
:
clone() the namespaces
mount /dev/mqueue
interact with net_ns
etc.
at restart, the task are restarted through execve() so they loose their
capabilities automatically.
but I think we could drop the CAP_SYS_ADMIN tests for some namespaces,
uts and ipc are good candidates. I guess network should require some
privilege.
C.
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