On Wed, Aug 12, 2020, 8:28 PM Richard Laager via devel <devel@ntpsec.org> wrote:
>
> I don't think I ever got an answer on this one.


flattened from listed website[0]:
>> Mitigation:
>>
>> Have enough trustworthy sources of time.
>> If you are serving time to a possibly hostile network, have your system get 
>> its time from other than unauthenticated IPv4 over the hostile network.
>> Use NTP packet authentication where appropriate.
>> Pay attention to error messages logged by ntpd.
>> Monitor your ntpd instances. If the pstats command of ntpq shows the value 
>> for "bogus origin" is increasing then that association is likely under 
>> attack.
>> If you must get unauthenticated time over IPv4 on a hostile network:
>>
>> Use restrict ... noserve to prevent this attack (note that this is a 
>> heavy-handed protection), which blocks time service to the specified network.
>> Upgrade to 4.2.8p14, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page or the NTP 
>> Public Services Project Download Page, and appropriately use some or all of 
>> the following in your ntp.conf file:
>>
>> server ... xmtnonce
>> pool ... xmtnonce
>> restrict ... serverresponse fuzz
>> pollskewlist default 6|6 (for example)

Defaults to no servers, but supports draft NTS instead of autokey,
does not enforce authentication or operator attention,  does not
support random nonce[1] instead of 4.2.8p14 'features'[0], supports
refclock-only time setting for some refclocks.

I think we could do more to address this 'client-side' issue. Possible
mitigations would include the new features from 4.2.8p14, defaulting
to larger minsane, minclock and maxclock values, as well as defaulting
to "pool 2.ntpsec.pool.ntp.org" for time. Also, moving the client-side
listener [2] might make it harder to spoof answers to the client-side.

I am probably wrong about much of this though.

[0] http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Main/NtpBug3596
[1] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ntp-data-minimization-04.txt
[2] 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ntp-port-randomization/?include_text=1
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