On Wed, Aug 12, 2020, 8:28 PM Richard Laager via devel <devel@ntpsec.org> wrote: > > I don't think I ever got an answer on this one.
flattened from listed website[0]: >> Mitigation: >> >> Have enough trustworthy sources of time. >> If you are serving time to a possibly hostile network, have your system get >> its time from other than unauthenticated IPv4 over the hostile network. >> Use NTP packet authentication where appropriate. >> Pay attention to error messages logged by ntpd. >> Monitor your ntpd instances. If the pstats command of ntpq shows the value >> for "bogus origin" is increasing then that association is likely under >> attack. >> If you must get unauthenticated time over IPv4 on a hostile network: >> >> Use restrict ... noserve to prevent this attack (note that this is a >> heavy-handed protection), which blocks time service to the specified network. >> Upgrade to 4.2.8p14, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page or the NTP >> Public Services Project Download Page, and appropriately use some or all of >> the following in your ntp.conf file: >> >> server ... xmtnonce >> pool ... xmtnonce >> restrict ... serverresponse fuzz >> pollskewlist default 6|6 (for example) Defaults to no servers, but supports draft NTS instead of autokey, does not enforce authentication or operator attention, does not support random nonce[1] instead of 4.2.8p14 'features'[0], supports refclock-only time setting for some refclocks. I think we could do more to address this 'client-side' issue. Possible mitigations would include the new features from 4.2.8p14, defaulting to larger minsane, minclock and maxclock values, as well as defaulting to "pool 2.ntpsec.pool.ntp.org" for time. Also, moving the client-side listener [2] might make it harder to spoof answers to the client-side. I am probably wrong about much of this though. [0] http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Main/NtpBug3596 [1] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ntp-data-minimization-04.txt [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ntp-port-randomization/?include_text=1 _______________________________________________ devel mailing list devel@ntpsec.org http://lists.ntpsec.org/mailman/listinfo/devel