On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 07:59:50PM +0000, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
> To expand on this one: it is true that the untrustworthy maintainer
> would have been able to add files to git too. But it is also true that
> people may much closer attention to the git commits than to the tarball.

In addition if you have a local checkout, it is hard for someone to
manipulate the upstream git history (commits or tags) in a way that
won't be easily noticed when you later re-pull latest objects. This
gives more confidence in the archives, even if the archives themselves
are unsigned.

> In fact, unless people get suspicious or something is broken, almost
> nobody analyses tarballs, in particular if they are *not* equivalent
> to 'git archive', but contain local irreproducible modifications, as
> is the case with autoconf scripts. Using the output from 'git archive'
> is better because it is easier to inspect.

In hindsight I'm pretty amazed that managed to get into a situation
where it was thought it was acceptable to be shipping auto-generated
shell scripts which can be MB in size, and are blindly run by anyone
who downloads the tarball. Admittedly autoconf originated in a
different age, but its staying power is surprising.

Many people mock the security risk of instructions saying

   curl some.site | sh

but at the same time are happy to do

  curl sometarballurl
  tar zxvf sometarball
  cd someproject
  ./configure

IMHO this latter scenario is worse from a security risk. In
the former scenario, at least you can leave off the '| sh'
bit and audit the shell script (which is usually short and
readable) before running it. It is practically impossible
for anyone to meaningfully audit an autoconf 'configure'
script.

With regards,
Daniel
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