On Wed, Jun 19, 2024 at 11:33 AM Vitaly Zaitsev via devel < devel@lists.fedoraproject.org> wrote:
> On 19/06/2024 17:49, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > This allows > > any privileged process to sign any future kmods, from any source. > > Yes. That's why it is preferable to ship built and signed in Koji kmod > packages, but nobody want to do this: neither Fedora nor RPM Fusion. > > Without a signature, the kernel module will not be loaded, so we have > only two options left: > 1. Ask end users to disable UEFI Secure boot completely. > 2. Use kmodgenca with akmods. > > The second option is better, IMO. While it does *feel* better, both options effectively remove any UEFI Secure boot protections. Unless the private key is off-system, anything will be able to be loaded without much fuss. -- Jonathan Steffan
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