On 11/22/22 11:59 AM, Simo Sorce wrote:
> On Tue, 2022-11-22 at 17:13 +0100, Fabio Valentini wrote:
>> - rust-curve25519-dalek
> 
> Asymmetric cryptography in pure rust should not be used, there is still
> no support in the language for constant time operations, which means
> there is a fat chance these implementations are susceptible to trivial
> timing attacks.
> 
> The only caveat is if the "pure rust" implementation actually embeds
> assembly optimization for modular arithmetic that are explicitly
> addressing constant time computation.
> 
> I am not aware of that being the case in any rust libraries yet.

FWIW, they do make claims about this:

https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/issues/157
https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/blob/main/README.md#safety

> All operations are implemented using constant-time logic (no
> secret-dependent branches, no secret-dependent memory accesses),
> unless specifically marked as being variable-time code. We believe
> that our constant-time logic is lowered to constant-time assembly, at
> least on x86_64 targets.
> 
> As an additional guard against possible future compiler
> optimizations, the subtle crate places an optimization barrier before
> every conditional move or assignment. More details can be found in
> the documentation for the subtle crate.

We package rust-subtle as well, so that's probably a useful trail to any
crates that are claiming pure-rust constant-time cryptography.

Anyway, I'll leave it to cryptography experts to verify these claims.
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